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LIBERALIZATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP IN U.S. AIR CARRIERS: THE
UNITED STATES MUST TAKE THE FIRST
STEP IN AVIATION GLOBALIZATION
DAVID T. ARLINGTON
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ORIGINAL proposal of British Airways (BA) to
purchase a substantial portion of USAir' would have
required the Department of Transportation (DOT) to
make a decision that would greatly affect international air
transportation for many years to come.2 However, on De-
cember 22, 1992, BA decided to withdraw its original of-
fer in the face of almost certain rejection by the DOT.3
In 1992, USAir originally agreed to sell BA a 44% share of the common eq-
uity in the airline in return for a payment of $750 million in cash. James T. Mc-
Kenna, USAir-BA Pact Will Spark New Transatlantic Battle, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH.,July 27, 1992, at 26. The deal also provided that BA would hold four seats
on USAir's board of directors, which would have been increased from 13 to 16
members, and all key decisions by the USAir board of directors would have to
have been approved by a super majority of 80% of the entire board. Id.; Paula
Dwyer et al., Air Raid. British Air's Bold Global Push, Bus. WK., Aug. 24, 1992, at 54,
60; see also infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text (discussing in depth the
original agreement between BA and USAir).
2 In fact, opponents to the original BA-USAir pact termed the possible DOT
decision in that case "[tihe most monumental policy decision since domestic de-
regulation." American Airlines et al., An Issue of National Policy, Competition
and Fairness: The Case Against the British Airways Takeover of USAir, (Aug. 20,
1992) (unpublished position paper, on file with American Airlines, Corporate
Communications Department).
S See British Airways Terminates Plan to Invest in USAir, PR Newswire, Dec. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File.
BA and USAir later completed a revised investment agreement calling for less
controversial levels of voting stock ownership and actual control. Robert L. Rose
& Brian Coleman, British Airways Buys Stake in USAir, Drawing Protests from Other
Carriers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at A3. The revised deal calls for a much
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One might think that the citizenship requirement of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 4 which restricts the level of
ownership that a foreign entity may have in a U.S. air car-
rier, 5 would have been a legal barrier to the proposed BA-
USAir alliance.6 The true cause of the demise of the origi-
smaller ($300 million) investment by BA giving the foreign carrier 19.9% of
USAir's voting stock and 24.6% of its total equity. Id. The new agreement elimi-
nated the super majority requirement and gave BA only three seats on USAir's 16
member board. Id. The agreement does, however, provide BA with the option of
investing a total of $450 million more into the U.S. carrier. Id. Of course such
increased investment would only come in the event that the government liberal-
izes the citizenship requirement. Id.
In order to implement the first phase of the newly structured alliance, two spe-
cific aspects of the deal had to first be approved. Id. First was a provision calling
for some code sharing between BA and USAir so that the former could feed
USAir's domestic passengers into its own international flights. Id.; see also In re
USAir and British Airways D.O.T. Order No. 93-3-17, 1993 WL 75439, *6 (Mar.
15, 1993) (approving of code-sharing arrangements between BA and USAir). The
other provision that required approval was the provision calling for BA to rent
three USAir planes and crews to fly routes between London and several U.S. cit-
ies. Rose & Coleman, supra at A3. Robert Crandall, president of American Air-
lines, stated that American Airlines "vigorously oppose[d] any attempt to
integrate the operations" of the two airlines "whether by code-sharing or any
other means." Id. The DOT, however, resisted such opposition and approved
both of these aspects of the new deal. See D.O.T. Order No. 93-3-17, 1993 WL
75439 (approving of code-sharing and wet leasing agreements between the two
airlines).
It should also be mentioned that the DOT is planning to continue evaluating
the citizenship status of USAir after the investment by BA. See id. at *13-14. The
DOT already approved of the first phase of the agreement. Id. at *3. However, it
has instituted proceedings and called for public comment on the likely status of
USAir's citizenship after the second and third phases of the agreement are en-
gaged. See id. at * 13-14. As of the date of this publication, the DOT had not yet
made a determination.
I Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958) (currently codified in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 states
that a U.S. air carrier must be a U.S. citizen and defines that term as follows:
"Citizen of the United States" means (a) an individual who is a citi-
zen of the United States or of one of its possessions, or (b) a partner-
ship of which each member is such an individual, or (c) a corporation
or association created or organized under the laws of the United
States or of any state, territory, or possession of the United States, of
which the president and two-thirds or more of the board of directors
and other managing officers thereof are such individuals and in
which at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or con-
trolled by persons who are citizens of the United States or of one of
its possessions.
Id.
The DOT has the authority to conduct continuing fitness investigations to
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nal deal, however, was actually a conglomeration of many
factors having very little to do with the law itself.7 This
analysis clearly demonstrates that the citizenship require-
ment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is archaic and
therefore must be liberalized and adapted to the new
world economy if U.S. air carriers are going to survive in
the upcoming world of global competition.8
Since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, 9
U.S. airlines have been struggling to stay in business and
if they are fortunate, to maintain profitability."0 Airlines
have consistently reported losses of millions and, in some
cases billions of dollars," t and are having to find ways to
determine if a U.S. carrier in fact remains a U.S. citizen once it has been deter-
mined to be such. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(r). Under § 204.4 of the DOT's Eco-
nomic Regulations, carriers undergoing substantial changes in operations are
required to provide the DOT with information relevant to their operations. 14
C.F.R. § 204.4 (1992); see also In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 89-9-51, at 1 (Sept. 29, 1989) (stating that the DOT considers signifi-
cant changes in ownership, such as those which would have occurred with USAir,
to constitute a substantial change in operations).
7 See infra notes 268-306 and accompanying text (discussing the failure to liber-
alize the air services agreement between the U.S. and Great Britain as the most
important factor causing the original alliance to go awry).
See generally James E. Gjerset, Comment, Crippling United States Airlines: Archaic
Interpretations of the Federal Aviation Act's Restriction on Foreign Capital Investments, 7
AM. U.J. INr'L L. & PoL'Y 173 (1991).
9 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (cur-
rently codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
10 "Since deregulation began, the airline industry has suffered the worst eco-
nomic losses in its history." Paul S. Dempsey, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire
Mythology: Economic Theory in Turbulence, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 305, 322 (1990); see
also Melvin A. Brenner, Airline Deregulation - A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16
TRANsP. L.J. 179 (1988) (discussing in depth the effects of airline deregulation).
I USAir Group, the parent company of USAir, reported a 1992 net loss of
$1.23 billion. Losses for Three Largest U.S. Airlines Approach $2.5 Billion in 1992, AIR-
PORTS, Feb. 2, 1993, at 46. The airline stated, however, that the majority of this
loss could be attributed to a $982 million charge because of a retiree benefits
accounting change. Id. Furthermore, UAL, the parent company for United Air-
lines reported a 1992 net loss of $956.8 million. Id. This figure is nearly 3 times
United's 1991 net loss of $331.9 million. Id. Delta also reported a 1992 net loss
of $564.8 million that almost doubles the airline's net loss of $239.5 million in
1991. Id. Finally, AMR Corp., parent of American Airlines, reported a 1992 net
loss of $935 million which exceeded 4 times its 1991 net loss of $240 million. Id.
Additionally AMR and UAL both stated that a large portion of their losses also
resulted from "one-time" charges because of a new accounting standard relating
to retiree benefits. Id.
After the second-quarter of 1993, it appeared that the airlines were on at least a
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cut costs,' 2 including massive lay offs13 and reduction of
air services to many marginally profitable destinations. 14
Fare wars during the summer of 1992, typically the airline
industry's most profitable season, caused most airlines to
report big losses.' 5 Furthermore, the end does not ap-
pear to be in sight. In fact, one analyst predicted that fare
wars will continue during 1993, and that therefore, the
airline industry as a whole will not become profitable until
at least the end of this year. 16
The deregulation of the U.S. airline industry, as well as
that of the European Community (EC) has also sparked
the beginning of airline globalization.' 7  As a result, air-
lines all over the world are joining forces in the hopes of
slow road to recovery. See Michael 0. Lavitt, Market Focus, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 26, 1993, at 11. USAir group reported a net income of $5.8 million
for the second-quarter of 1993. Id. This compared to a loss for the same period
of 1991 of $131.1 million. Id. Furthermore, AMR reported earnings of $47 mil-
lion for the same time period. Id. This figure also compared to a loss of $183
million during the same period of 1992. Id. Finally, Delta also reported a profit
of $7.15 million for the second-quarter of 1993 compared to a $180 million loss
for the second-quarter of 1992. Id.
The figures indicating that airlines may in fact be on the road to recovery must
be received with caution. See USAir Group Reports Second Quarter Net and Operating
Income, PR NEWSWIRE, July 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File. As
only one example, although USAir Group reported a 1993 second-quarter net
profit, USAir still had a net loss of $55.2 million during the first 6 months of 1993.
Id.
12 Delta Airline's executives were shocked to learn that eliminating decorative
lettuce leaf from meals served on the airplanes produced annual savings of $1.4
million. Jerry Schwartz, Delta Loses $108.2 Million and Plans to Cut 576 ofJobs, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1992, at DI.
I Id. In July, 1992, Delta announced plans to cut five percent of its 80,000
employee work force. Id.
1 USAir Chief Sees Start of Turnaround, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 14, 1992, § 1, at
14. As part of a cost-cutting program in 1992, USAir closed its Dayton, Ohio hub
and also reduced services in the highly competitive West Coast Market. Id. In
July, 1992, American Airlines also announced plans to reduce flights at one of its
three smaller hub airports, Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, San Jose, California,
or Nashville, Tennessee. David Field, American's Losses Outpace Forecasts, WASH.
TIMES, July 16, 1992, at Cl.
' Fare Wars, supra note 11, at 3C.
Doug Carroll, Analyst: Airlines Face Another Year of Losses, USA TODAY, Aug. 7,
1992, at 3B; but see supra note 1 (discussing possible slight recovery of airlines
during second-quarter of 1993).
17 George W. James, How Will the Future Airline Globe Be Divided?, AIRLINE PILOT,
Oct. 1990, at 24, 25.
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being able to compete in the new world market which ana-
lysts say is coming within the next ten years. 18 This new
market is predicted to consist of only a few mega world-
wide airlines that will provide service to all important
points of destination.' 9
Extreme limitations on foreign ownership in U.S. carri-
ers, such as those imposed by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, will inhibit the ability of U.S. airlines to compete. °
The United States airline industry is virtually unable to
profit from its endeavors in the United States. 2' Thus, it
is unlikely that U.S. carriers are in a position to globalize
alone. The current limitations will also inhibit globaliza-
tion of the international airline industry as a whole. The
United States market is the largest domestic market in the
world and is essential to the effort of any foreign air car-
18 Id. at 28.
19 Id.
20 USAir, The Case For the British Airways Investment in USAir, at 9 (Aug. 28,
1992) (unpublished position paper, on file with USAir, Corporate Communica-
tions Department). USAir stated that one of the primary reasons why the DOT
should have approved the BA-USAir pact was to promote competition as it was
intended to take place under the Airline Deregulation Act. Id. at 5; see also Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(3), (7)(A) (stating that the act
will promote reliance on competition and the prevention of anticompetitive prac-
tices). USAir stated specifically:
The only dangerous precedent which could result from this transac-
tion is disapproval. Disapproval would close the door on the only
remaining source of capital for U.S.-flag airlines other than the Big
Three. It would be a signal that the marketplace can only work if the
special interests of American, Delta and United are not threatened
by the specter of competition. It would tell other, nations that airline
deregulation, to borrow from the Big Three, is more a myth than
reality and invite a reaction of protectionism. USAir is not asking for
affirmative relief. It is not seeking special treatment or federal sup-
port. It has only one message: let the marketplace work for USAir as
it has worked for American, Delta and United.
USAir, supra, at 9.
21 See Tom Incantalupo, Re-Regulation of Airlines? American's Chairman Says Issue is
Sure to Come Up in '93, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17, 1992, at 53. In fact, U.S. carriers have
lost approximately $7.5 billion as a whole over the past three years. Id. This fig-
ure includes the approximate $2 billion dollars which the airlines lost in 1992,
partially as a result of brutal fare wars during the summer season. David Field,
Airlines Big Losers in 1992"s Fare Wars; Consumers Profited from Many Specials, WASH.
TiMEs, Dec. 9, 1992, at CI.
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rier to provide worldwide air service. 2 Finally, and most
importantly, the recent United States insistence on open
access to foreign markets before it will liberalize the
archaic foreign ownership limitations in U.S. carriers will
likely spark protectionist sentiments in countries around
the world, thereby preventing market access that is essen-
tial to globalization of any airline.23
This Comment emphasizes the importance of the liber-
alization of the citizenship requirement of the 1958 Act as
a first step in the process of airline globalization. If the
United States decides to participate in world aviation, its
laws must keep pace with this policy as well as with the
world economy. This Comment begins with a brief dis-
cussion of the history of the citizenship requirement in
the 1958 Act. Second, it addresses the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) and DOT interpretations of this require-
ment, focusing on the most recent decisions in the area.
Third, it discusses the many policy arguments both for
and against the original BA-USAir alliance. Fourth, it
analyzes the failure of the original alliance, focusing on
the roles the 1958 Act and current bilateral issues be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K. may have played in that fail-
ure. Finally, the Comment discusses the DOT's recent
proposal for open skies agreements with European coun-
2 The failure of the original BA-USAir alliance was viewed as a setback for BA's
global plans. Richard W. Stevenson, British Air Halts Plan to Purchase Big Stake in
USAir, N.Y. TIMES, Late Ed., Dec. 23, 1992, at Al. Analysts confirmed that for BA
to have the global airline it envisions, the U.S. must be a part of its market, and,
therefore, BA would not let this setback prevent its effort to achieve some type of
alliance with a U.S. carrier. Julie Schmit, USAir Deal in Trouble?, USA TODAY, Dec.
18, 1992, at 2B. After all, the United States domestic airline market constitutes
40% of the whole world market. Richard M. Weintraub, Leveraging An Airline
Linkup; U.S. Prepared to Block USAir Deal Unless Britain Opens Market, WAsH. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1992, at B9 [hereinafter Leveraging An Airline Linkup]. In fact, BA did not
allow this setback to hinder its efforts. See Rose & Coleman, supra note 3, at A3.
On January 21, 1993, BA and USAir agreed to a smaller scale alliance that will
eventually give BA the option to increase its investment to the originally proposed
levels. Id.
2' See, e.g., Bill Poling, France Gives Up Pact with U.S., but Air Services Will Continue;
Commercial Aviation Brief Article, TRAVEL WKLY., May 7, 1992, at 39 [hereinafter
France Gives Up Pact]; see also infra notes 276-90 and accompanying text (discussing
the DOT's insistence on open skies agreements as a condition for liberalization).
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
tries and suggests the first step that the United States
must take to make true global aviation a reality.
II. ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
REQUIREMENT
A. AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926
The Air Commerce Act of 192624 contained the first en-
acted limitation on foreign ownership of U.S. carriers.2 5
The 1926 Act defined a citizen of the United States as an
individual who is a U.S. citizen, a partnership composed
only of U.S. citizens, or a corporation that was organized
in the United States and that fulfilled two further require-
ments: (1) two-thirds of its board of directors had to be
U.S. citizens, and (2) U.S. citizens had to own fifty-one
percent of its voting stock.26 The focus of this discussion
will be on the corporate form of ownership.
-1. National Security Concerns
In order to understand one of the major arguments that
critics later used to attack the original alliance between
BA and USAir, 27 it is necessary to discuss the role that
national security policy played in the enactment of the cit-
izenship requirement of the 1926 Act. 28 With World War
I still fresh in the political arena, concern with the coun-
try's security during wartime was pervasive. 29 The pri-
mary concern was that U.S. owned aircraft should be
available during time of war to serve as an auxiliary air
force fleet.3 0 The pilots of these aircraft would also serve
24 Ch. 344, Pub. L. No. 69-254,44 Stat. 568 (1926) (formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 171-
84 (West 1951)) (repealed 1958).
25 Id. § 9(a), 44 Stat. at 573.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., infra notes 177-81 (discussing national security concerns with regard
to the BA-USAir alliance).
211 See Gjerset, supra note 8, at 180-82 (discussing in depth the national security
concern and its relation to the citizenship requirement).
29 John T. Stewart, Jr., United States Citizenship Requirements of the Federal Aviation
Act - A Misty Moor of Legalisms or the Rampart of Protectionism?, 55J. AIR L. & COM.
685, 694-95 (1990).
30 H.R. REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1925); see also Stewart, supra note
1993] 139
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as auxiliary personnel during wartime."'
To ensure that such aircraft and personnel would be
available in the event of an emergency situation, Congress
made it clear in a 1925 House Report dealing with the
issue of the citizenship requirement that all "[r]egistered
aircraft of the United States will serve as an auxiliary air
force in time of war."'3 2 The House stated that U.S. citi-
zens should therefore control such aircraft so that the
government would have easy access to the fleet in a time
of need. 3 In that report, the House went on to say:
The Secretary of Commerce and representatives of the
Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy agreed that it
was desirable, in the case of corporate owners, that at least
75 per cent of interest in the corporation should be held
by citizens of the United States, for the reason that corpo-
rations created under our laws, but in fact foreign con-
trolled, should not be able to possess craft that fly the
United States flag and [craft that] should be a part of our
air-fleet auxiliary in time of war.3 4
Thus were the beginnings of the relationship between the
concern for national security and the citizenship require-
ment contained in the Air Commerce Act of 1926. 35
When the requirement was finally enacted with the 1926
Act, however, the requirement for corporations was that
U.S. citizens hold only fifty-one percent of the carrier's
voting interest.3 6
2. Fostering and Protecting the Airline Industry
The 1926 Act itself was the federal government's first
attempt to regulate the airline industry in the United
States.37 Although foreign ownership warranted sufficient
29, at 694-95 (discussing the citizenship requirements of those who own such
aircraft).
.1 H.R. REP. No. 1262, at 2.
32 Id.
" Id. at 26.
14 Id.
35 Pub. L. No. 69-254, § 9(a), 44 Stat. at 573 (1926).
- Id.
.17 Stewart, supra note 29, at 690.
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concern to include it in the 1926 Act, the primary motiva-
tion for the regulation of the airline industry as a whole
came as a result of the chaotic state of the industry after
World War J.38 After the war, the airline manufacturing
industry had grown to unprecedented levels that the pri-
vate aviation industry as it stood could not sustain.3 9 Fur-
thermore, those within the airline industry recognized
that airline transportation would likely not be successful if
the federal government did not step in to foster its devel-
opment as it had done with the automobile and shipping
industries. °
This idea of government regulation with the purpose of
fostering development of the airline industry is important
in the discussion of the citizenship requirement. One of
the primary reasons behind the enactment of the 1926 Act
and the citizenship requirement was the "encouragement
and protection of civil air navigation. '41 This policy be-
came even more evident just before the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 193842 passed when proponents of the protection-
ist position called for the government to provide eco-
nomic support for U.S. carriers who were competing with
3' NICK A. KoMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY
UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT 1926-1938 11 (1978).
- Id. at 11-12. With World War I over, there was a surplus of pilots as well as
aircraft on the market. Id. This encouraged former military pilots to buy the air-
planes at rock bottom prices and to make a living providing transportation and
entertainment to the public. Id. at 12. This situation, however, led to airplanes
which were unfit to fly and a general chaos in the unregulated skies. Id. at 7-9.
Furthermore, the flood of the aircraft on the market had a devastating effect on
the aircraft manufacturing industry. Id. at 12.
40 KoMONS, supra note 38, at 7-9. In fact, the framework and language of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 were in many cases just applications to aviation law of
that which had long been a part of the law relating to water transportation. H.R.
REP. No. 1262, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1925). The citizenship requirement for
corporate owners of aircraft and airlines was modelled after the Shipping Act of
1916. Id. at 6; see Shipping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-260, § 2, 39 Stat. 728, 729
(1916) (current version codified at 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1988)); see also Stewart,
supra note 29, at 693-96 (discussing the role of maritime precedent on the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 and its continuing influence on aviation law).
41 H.R. REP. No. 1262, at 2.
42 Ch. 601, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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foreign carriers in foreign commerce.43
B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938 THROUGH FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT OF 1958
During the 1930's, the United States began to reevalu-
ate its international trade policy as a whole.44 The nation
had just suffered through the Great Depression and
"[p]olicy-makers [began to shift] their economic position
from advocating the classical theory of free trade to heavy
reliance on governmental intervention. ' 45 Thus, even
stronger cries came to protect and maintain control over
the airline industry.4 6
Continuing to reflect these concerns for protectionism
and also the security of the nation, the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 193847 accordingly contained an even more restric-
tive citizenship requirement for U.S. carriers.48 The Act,
instead of requiring U.S. citizens to own only fifty-one
percent of the voting stock of U.S. air carriers, actually
required seventy-five percent ownership. 4a
This version of the citizenship requirement contained
in the 1938 Act survived virtually unchanged and became
incorporated into the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.50 The
citizenship requirement of the 1958 Act has continued in
effect even until today unchanged, at least as far as the
written law is concerned.51
13 See Gjerset, supra note 8, at 183 (citing Aviation: Hearing on H.R. 4652 Before the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1937)).
44 Id. at 182.
4.1 Id. (citations omitted).
46 Id. at 183-84.
47 Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
4, Id. § 1(13), 52 Stat. 978.
49 Id.
50 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (currently codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1301(16) (1988)); see also supra note 5 (quoting the language of the citizenship
requirement contained in the 1958 Act).
. Id. Although the written law has remained unchanged since the 1938 Act,
the CAB and the DOT have approached cases involving the citizenship issue on a
case by case basis extending the letter of the law to include an actual control test
above and beyond the written law itself. See In re Acquisition of Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at 4-5 (Sept. 29, 1989); see also infra part III
(discussing CAB and DOT applications of this actual control test).
19931 FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 143
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP
REQUIREMENT BY THE CAB AND DOT: A
LONG HISTORY OF STRICT
CONSTRUCTION
So far this discussion has focused on what the citizen-
ship requirement of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 spe-
cifically and explicitly requires.52 However, the more
important aspect is how the CAB and the DOT, the bod-
ies empowered with the authority to decide if particular
airlines are complying with the requirement, 53 have inter-
preted the rule over the years. The following section ana-
lyzes the earliest decisions of the CAB regarding the
citizenship issue as well as the most recent decisions of
the DOT.
A. TRADITIONAL STRICT INTERPRETATION AND
IMPOSITION OF THE ACTUAL CONTROL TEST
Traditionally, the CAB and DOT have interpreted the
citizenship requirement very strictly, requiring first that
the airline in question satisfy the letter of the statute it-
self.54 This means U.S. citizens must own seventy-five
12 See supra note 5 (quoting the language of the citizenship requirement).
51 The CAB, created under the name "Civil Aeronautics Authority," was origi-
nally established under § 201 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pub. L. No.
75-706, § 201(a), 52 Stat. 973, 980-81 (1938). The Authority was given power to
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity which an air carrier was and
still is required to obtain before engaging in any air transportation. Id. § 401 (a),
52 Stat. at 987 (current version codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(a) (1988)). The
1938 Act as well as current law required that such a carrier "must be fit, willing,
and able to perform such transportation properly" and must conform to the pro-
visions of the 1958 Act, which include the citizenship requirement. Id.
§ 401(d)(l), 52 Stat. at 987; see also id. § 101(13), 52 Stat. 978 (stating the defini-
tion ofa U.S. citizen); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(d)(1) (1988) (current version requir-
ing air carriers to conform with all provisions of the 1958 Act). The 1958 Act
continued the existence of the Authority, but under the name of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 201(a), 72
Stat. 731 (1958). The power of the CAB, however, was terminated by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1744 (1978)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a) (1988)). At the same time, this power was
transferred to the DOT. Id. § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1745 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1551(b) (1988)).
54 See Willye Peter Daetwyler, d/b/a Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Per-
mit, 58 C.A.B. 118, 119 (1971).
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percent of the airline's voting stock and that two-thirds of
the members of the airline's board of directors or other
managing officers must be U.S. citizens. 55 There is, how-
ever, a second part of the citizenship requirement that the
statute does not clearly state: The requirement that a non-
U.S. citizen cannot actually control the airline.56
1. Earliest Interpretations through Daetwyler
The CAB set forth this actual control test early on in a
1940 decision. The CAB and DOT have restated the
test many times over the years, and it is clearly still in ef-
fect today.58 One of the most widely cited decisions by
the DOT, which thoroughly discusses and applies the ac-
tual control test, is Willye Peter Daetwyler, D.B.A. Interameri-
can Airfreight Co., Foreign Permit.59 That case involved the
application of Interamerican Airfreight Corporation (In-
teramerican) requesting that the Board grant the com-
pany an operating authorization as a U.S. citizen
international airfreight forwarder under part 297 of the
Board's Economic Regulations. 60
The CAB stated that the issue in that case was "whether
Interamerican qualifie[d] as a 'citizen of the United States'
pursuant to section [101(16)] of the Federal Aviation
5- Id.; see also supra note 5 (citing the actual language of the citizenship require-
ment as set forth in modem version of the 1958 Act).
56 Uraba Medellin and Cent. Airways Inc. - Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 334, 337 (1940).
57 Id. In that decision, the CAB stated:
[tihe apparent general intent of the statute is to insure that air carri-
ers receiving economic support from the United States and seeking
certificates of public convenience and necessity, under section 401
of the Act shall be citizens of the United States in fact, in purpose and
in management. The shadow of substantial foreign influence may
not exist.
Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
5, See In re Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41, at 10 (Dec. 21,
1989); In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at
4 (Sept. 29, 1989); In re Intera Arctic Serv., Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at 5
(Aug. 18, 1987); In re Page Avjet Corp., C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5, at 2 (July 1,
1983); Premiere Airlines, Fitness Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11, at 103
(May 5, 1982); Daetwyler, 58 C.A.B. at 119.
59 58 C.A.B. 118 (1971).
lil Part 297 of the Regulations is currently codified at 14 C.F.R. § 297 (1992).
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Act."' There was no question that U.S. citizens owned
seventy-five percent of the voting stock of Interamerican
or that two-thirds of its board of directors consisted of
U.S. citizens.62 The question was whether Daetwyler, a
non-U.S. citizen of Swiss nationality and twenty-five per-
cent stockholder, exhibited actual control over the air-
line.63 The CAB found that in fact he did.64 Although
Interamerican met the "bare minimum" standards of the
citizenship requirement, the CAB focused on both the
close personal relationships between Daetwyler and the
other stockholders of Interamerican and the fact that
many of those same stockholders were actually employees
of other Daetwyler-owned companies. 65  As a result of
Daetwyler's actual control over Interamerican, the CAB
found that the airline did not qualify as a U.S. citizen and
therefore did not meet the requirements of a U.S. citizen
airfreight forwarder under the Board's regulations.6 6
2. Premiere
The CAB once again addressed the issue of actual con-
trol in Premiere Airlines, Fitness Investigation .67 This case in-
volved Premiere Airlines' (Premiere) application for a
certificate to engage in scheduled interstate air transpor-
tation. Such a certificate required that Premiere be fit,
willing, and able to perform the services in question and
61 Daetwyler, 58 C.A.B. at 119 (citation omitted).
62 Id.
63 Id.
- Id. at 120.
65 Id. at 121.
66 Id. at 120-2 1. In making this finding, the CAB argued that the intent of Con-
gress in enacting the citizenship requirement was to "insure that air carriers is-
sued licenses by the United States as U.S. carriers would be owned and controlled by
citizens of the United States." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
Board insisted that the notion that Congress might have intended the phrase to be
read disjunctively, in other words, owned or controlled, was completely illogical
and would totally undermine the purpose of the citizenship requirement. Id. at
121. Under such a reading, the Board stated, Interamerican could clearly be
deemed a U.S. citizen despite the fact that it is subject to extensive if not complete
foreign control. Id.
67 C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11 (May 5, 1982). The Board stated that "as a factual
matter, the carrier must actually be controlled by U.S. citizens." Id. at 103.
1993] 145
146 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
to comply with the Act and any other applicable rules or
regulations. The more important requirement in relation
to this discussion was that Premiere be a U.S. citizen as
defined in the 1958 Act.68
Originally an administrative law judge who examined
the case recommended to the CAB that Premiere had
failed to establish that it was a U.S. citizen pursuant to
section 101(16) of the 1958 Act.69 The problem as deter-
mined by the judge was that Joseph Cicippio, a co-
founder of Premiere, had borrowed $2.5 million from his
Saudi Arabian employer to invest in the venture.70 The
judge found that Cicippio, as a result of this loan, was
under the control of his Saudi Arabian employer and that
the latter had a substantial interest in the successful oper-
ation of the airline.7 '
Despite this clear control by a non-U.S. citizen, the
CAB agreed to stay its final decision on the issue of Pre-
miere's citizenship status72 and allowed Premiere the op-
portunity to reorganize with the hope that such a
restructuring would eliminate the CAB's concern over
foreign control. 73 In reconsidering Premiere's applica-
tion, the CAB once again focused on the issue of actual
control in determining citizenship. 4 As in Daetwyler, the
CAB stated that there had never been any question that
I ld. at 10 1-02; see supra note 5 (quoting the exact language of the citizenship
requirement).
69 C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11, at 102.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 C.A.B. Order No. 81-10-14 (Oct. 1, 1981).
73 C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11, at 102. The CAB stated:
[T]he applicant reorganized itself to nullify any control the Sheikh
may exercise through Mr. Cicippio. According to [the administra-
tive law judge], it took the following steps: (1) Mr. Cicippio resigned
from the applicant's management and board of directors; (2) Mr.
Cicippio's voting interest in the applicant has been transferred to an
independent third-party voting trustee, the Bank of America; (3) a
new senior financial officer has been hired to replace Mr. Cicippio;
and (4) Premier [sic] will pursue equity capital from sources other
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Premiere met the statutory requirements that U.S. citizens
own seventy-five percent of its voting stock and that at
least two-thirds of its board of directors or other manag-
ing officers be U.S. citizens.75 The CAB agreed with the
administrative law judge that after Premiere's reorganiza-
tion, the airline had successfully stripped Cicippio of his
control over the airline and had thus eliminated any con-
cerns over actual control which the CAB may have had.76
3. Page Avjet
Following the Premiere decision, the CAB again ad-
dressed the issue of foreign control in In re Page Avjet.77
For a brief period it appeared that the CAB, through this
decision, had begun to liberalize its past strict interpreta-
tion of the citizenship requirement.78 However, as will be
discussed, this apparent liberalization was short lived.79
75 Id.
76 Id. In an attempt to strictly monitor Premiere's citizenship status, the CAB
imposed the following condition in Premiere's certificate:
(4) Prior to the inauguration of service under this certificate and
thereafter, on August 10th and February 10th of each year, the
holder shall file with the Director of the Bureau of Domestic Avia-
tion a report, in narrative form, describing any changes in its officers
or directors and a current financial statement which includes the
identification of all persons who hold more than five percent of its
equity and the amount held by each. The report shall include the
citizenship and residence of all creditors holding in excess of five
percent of the total outstanding debt. If any debt or equity interest
in excess of five percent is held directly or indirectly on behalf of
some other person, the report shall include the citizenship and resi-
dence of the beneficial owner together with the full text of any writ-
ten agreement or a summary of any oral agreement between the
parties pertaining to such interest; provided that this requirement will
be terminated upon Board approval of the termination of the Voting
Trust Agreement dated as of December 16, 1981 entered into by
and between Mr. Joseph J. Cicippio and Bank of America NT & SA
as voting trustee, unless the board determines at that time that the
public interest requires continuation of this reporting requirement.
Id. at 106.
17 C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5, at 5 (July 1, 1983); C.A.B. Order No. 84-8-12 (Aug.
2, 1984).
71 See C.A.B. Order No. 84-8-12, at 2 (allowing airline to maintain its citizenship
status despite the appearance of foreign control through a buy-out provision).
71 See In re Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at 11 (Aug.
18, 1987) (stating that the decision in Page Avjet constitutes the outer limits of the
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In the Page Avjet case, the CAB first applied its strict in-
terpretation of the actual control test and determined that
U.S. citizens did not actually control the carrier.8s To the
contrary, the CAB stated that the nonvoting stockholders
in Page Avjet (Page), who were not U.S. citizens, actually
had power to control the airline."' The CAB supported
its determination by pointing out the specific methods of
control that the nonvoting stockholders had:
In Page's proposal, the nonvoting stockholders do not
have day to day operational control; however, they have
the right to influence many of the crucial decisions of the
company. They have the power to block any proposal by
the voting stockholders for a company consolidation,
merger or acquisition. Similarly, they have the power to
dissolve the company and liquidate its assets. If the non-
voting stockholders disapprove of the way that the officers
and director conduct the company's affairs, they can vote
for dissolution of the company.8 2
The CAB concluded by saying that considering the level
of power of the nonvoting stockholders, it was clear that
the officers of the company would follow their wishes.83
The CAB, however, agreed to give Page the opportu-
nity to restructure its ownership in the hopes of obtaining
citizenship status under the Act.84 In restructuring the or-
ganization, Page submitted a plan that called for the crea-
tion of a new corporation that would have two classes of
stockholders. The plan stated that Page would own one
class of stock which would be nonvoting common stock.
The second class of stock would be owned by U.S. citizens
and this class would be voting preferred stock. One of the
more interesting aspects of this plan was that it contained
a buy-out provision which stated that if certain events
citizenship requirement); see also Stewart, supra note 29, at 709 (questioning the
validity of the Page Avjet decision).
10 C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5, at 5.
S1 Id. at 3.
"11 Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
83 Id.
H4 Id. at 5.
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were to occur, U.S. citizen stockholders would agree to
purchase Page's nonvoting stock owned by foreign citi-
zens at its "fair market value." 85
The CAB did not elaborate on exactly how it came to its
decision, but it determined that effective control no
longer rested in the hands of the nonvoting sharehold-
ers.86 However, the buy-out provision still appeared to
restrict the activity of the airline significantly. The condi-
tions of the buy-out provision were sufficiently ambiguous
to allow nonvoting, non-U.S. citizen stockholders a signif-
icant amount of leverage. The conditions stated that U.S.
citizen shareholders agreed to purchase Page's stock in
the event of:
(1) consolidation, merger or acquisition of control by an-
other entity; (2) sale of its assets other than in the ordinary
course of business; (3) issuance of additional stock; (4)
"waste" of corporate assets or payment of unreasonable
compensation to management or key personnel; or (5)
"self dealing" by management or key personnel that may
be detrimental to Page's investment.8 7
The first three conditions were very specific events.
The conditions in themselves were quite restrictive and
certainly would have influenced management decisions on
a regular, if not day to day, basis. More importantly, how-
ever, the final two provisions for the U.S. stockholder buy-
out (prohibitions against the wasting of corporate assets
or payment of unreasonable compensation and against
self-dealing by management or key personnel) seemed to
leave a great deal of room for interpretation and discre-
tion for the nonvoting stockholders regarding exactly
when one of these conditions would be violated.
These provisions seemed to have provided Page with an
escape hatch in case they felt that the company was not
being run according to its wishes. Thus, to maintain the
non-voting stockholder's investment, the company's man-
8.1 C.A.B. Order No. 84-8-12, at 1.
'6 See id. at 2.
.7 Id. at 1 n.3.
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agement was likely to defer to their requests, and this cer-
tainly appeared to be a case of actual control. However,
the CAB allowed an apparent relaxation of the actual con-
trol test and permitted the airline to maintain its
citizenship.88
4. Intera
Nevertheless, in In re Intera Arctic Services, 89 the DOT in-
dicated that the apparent liberalization of the interpreta-
tion of the citizenship requirement by its predecessor, the
CAB, should not concern us for long.90 Specifically, the
DOT stated that the Page Avjet case represented the ex-
treme outer limits of the interpretation of the citizenship
requirement. 9' In making this statement, however, the
DOT stated that there were enough significant differences
between Page Avjet and Intera to avoid the question of
whether the DOT would have decided Page Avjet in the
same way as did its predecessor.92
Intera involved a foreign entity's (IT) creation of the
company Intera Arctic Services (IAS). This undertaking
was an attempt to obtain U.S. citizen status in order to
carry out IT's operations in the United States. In creating
IAS, IT patterned its structure on what the CAB had re-
cently approved in its Page Avjet decision. Thus, IAS con-
sisted of two classes of stock: "voting preferred, of which
no more than 25 percent [was to] be held by non-U.S. citi-
zens; and nonvoting common stock, which [was] held by
IT."' 9 3 The company's articles of incorporation also re-
quired that its president and two-thirds of its board of di-
rectors and management officials be U.S. citizens.
Furthermore, and more importantly under the actual con-
trol analysis, there was a buy-out provision which IAS
contended was very similar to that in Page Avjet.
- See id. at 2.
89 D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43 (Aug. 18, 1987).
0 Id. at 11.
, Id.
92 Id.
w, Id. at 6.
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In distinguishing Intera from the CAB's decision in Page
Avjet, the DOT noted differences in the buy-out provisions
which seemed to leave IT with more effective control in
IAS than non-U.S. citizens had in Page Avjet.94 The most
significant difference between the cases, according to the
DOT, was the total level of ownership which the foreign
entity had in the U.S. air carrier. 95 For example, the DOT
pointed out that in Page Avjet the non-U.S. citizen stock-
holders "held only about 9% of the issued and outstand-
ing stock of all classes," and therefore, the buy-out
provision would not be extremely burdensome on the
U.S. citizen shareholders should a buy-out come to pass.96
In contrast, however, the foreign stockholders in IAS held
almost eighty-two percent of the issued and outstanding
stock of all classes. Therefore, the DOT concluded that
the burden would be much higher on U.S. citizen share-
holders than was the case in Page Avjet.97 Thus, foreign
citizens had much more influence in Intera than such per-
sons had in Page Avjet. 9s
Next, the DOT stated the most important reason for
Id at 11. Specifically, the DOT stated that:
The Page Avjet buy-out provision set a price of one-half of the net
tangible book value per common share (after allowance for liquida-
tion preference of preferred shares), plus six times earnings per
common share. The IAS provision sets a price of full net tangible
book value per common share (after allowance for liquidation pref-
erence of preferred shares). Thus, in the Page situation, the buy-out
price would be lower if the company was not profitable and, there-
fore, an unprofitable company would be better able to afford the
necessary payment than it would under the IAS buy-out provision.
Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted).
9, Id. at 12.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. The DOT considered the liquidation provision in the agreement be-
tween IAS and IT as another indicia of control. Id. The DOT pointed out that the
liquidation provisions were "such that the U.S. citizen voting shareholders bear
little risk in the event of failure and would reap little reward if the company were
dissolved." Id. The DOT stated that instead, the "risks and rewards lie with the
non-U.S. citizen owners." Id. In other words, it was clear to the DOT that the
person or shareholders who would incur the most risk in the event of a liquidation
would clearly have a vested interest in guaranteeing that such a liquidation did not
occur; therefore, it is likely that such a party would assert or at least attempt to
assert control over the U.S. carrier in order to avoid the liquidation. See id.
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deciding against IAS on the actual control test and citizen-
ship question: "Finally, and most importantly, our show
cause order found that Messrs. Lantz and Grandia, upon
whom IAS relies to establish its citizenship, are key em-
ployees of IT and therefore 'ready conduits for the exer-
cise by [IT] of control over IAS, Inc.' "99 Lantz and
Grandia, who were both U.S. citizen directors and man-
agement officials of IAS, were also officers of IT, the for-
eign entity that created IAS. The DOT went on to say:
The fact that these gentlemen are U.S. citizens and major
shareholders in IAS's non-U.S. citizen affiliates does not
negate foreign control. To the contrary, as major stock-
holders, they have far more at stake in seeing to it that IT
and ITC are successful in carrying out their various activi-
ties than a "mere" employer-employee relationship ....
Thus, we conclude that the potential for foreign influence
and control by these gentlemen is far greater than that
found to be decisive in Daetwyler, which IAS seeks to
distinguish. 0
The Intera decision sent a vivid message to future appli-
cants that the DOT would scrutinize any case in which the
parties have apparently organized themselves in an at-
tempt to meet only the explicit statutory requirements of
the 1958 Act and not necessarily the spirit of the law.' 0 '
5. Northwest I
In September 1989, the DOT handed down yet another
decision reinforcing its intolerance for foreign control of
U.S. air carriers. °2 In Northwest I the DOT once again fo-
cused on the actual control that foreign interests had over
Northwest Airlines. 0 3 In Northwest I, the DOT was con-
09 Id.
00 Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
lo Id. at 11.
102 In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51
(Sept. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Northwest 1].
0,0 Id. at 4. As was the case in many of the decisions already set forth in this
Comment, the DOT specifically stated that the facts in this case clearly satisfied
the letter of the law set forth in § 101(16) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Id.;
see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16).
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cerned with Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maasschappij (KLM),
a Dutch citizen and foreign air carrier. The concern
arose out of KLM's ownership of 56.74 percent of the eq-
uity in Wings Holdings, Inc. (Wings), a company created
for the purpose of purchasing Northwest Airlines.
Although KLM claimed it was going to own less than five
percent of the voting interest in Northwest, the DOT
countered this argument by stating that "it is clear from
our precedent that a large share in a carrier's equity poses
citizenship problems, even where the interest does not
take the form of voting stock, particularly if there are
other ties to the foreign entity."'' 0 4 The DOT also con-
cluded that due to its lack of voting stock, KLM would
have a large incentive to participate in the business of the
U.S. airline in a significant way in order to protect its busi-
ness investment. 10 5
The DOT did not, however, rest its decision solely on
the high level of equity interest KLM had in Wings (and
therefore Northwest). Instead, the DOT examined other
links between the two entities and decided that KLM was
in a de facto position of control.10 6 First of all, KLM was
allowed to name one person to the Wings twelve-member
board of directors.0 7 Second, KLM had the right to or-
ganize a three member committee which would advise
Northwest in the area of financial affairs. 0 8 The DOT, in
light of this information, concluded that it was likely that
KLM would use these methods to control Northwest in a
way which would protect the former's $400 million
interest. 109
104 Northwest I, D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at 6 (citation omitted).
105 Id.
1- Id. at 7.
107 The DOT also pointed out that "[t]here [were] no restrictions on the KLM
board member's participation in Northwest's decisionmaking." Id.
108 There were also no limits placed on the advisory committee's authority or
scope of advice. Id.
1-' Id. at 7. The DOT was also very concerned by the fact that KLM was not
simply a foreign citizen but that it was also an air carrier. Id. at 8. The concern
becomes much stronger when the foreign carrier in question actually competes in
certain routes with the entity it is trying to invest in and control, as such a situa-
tion could easily destroy all advantages of competition. Id. The DOT found that
19931
154 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
In its decision in Northwest I, however, the DOT was not
forced to declare that Northwest would no longer be a
U.S. citizen. Instead, Northwest and Wings agreed to take
steps that substantially eliminated the foreign control
concerns of the DOT." 0 First, Northwest and KLM
agreed to reduce KLM's share of Wing's equity to no
more than twenty-five percent within six months from the
date of the consent order.' Until that time, the parties
agreed to place KLM's interest that exceeded twenty-five
percent into a voting trust free from KLM's control." 2
The parties also agreed to eliminate the ability of KLM to
create a financial advisory committee to Northwest and
that KLM's member of the board of directors would be
recused under certain circumstances.' ' 3 Finally, North-
west agreed to make reports to the DOT concerning any
agreements or change in ownership that might effect the
airline's citizenship status." 4 Thus, the DOT was able to
allow Wings and Northwest to restructure and avoid an
adverse decision. 115
6. Discovery
Just months after the decision was handed down in the
consent order of Northwest I, the DOT once again had the
opportunity to address the issue of actual control in In re
Discovery Airways, Inc. 116 The DOT in this case, however,
focused more on the issue of foreign control over mem-
bers of the board of directors." 7 The Discovery board of
directors consisted of seven members, four of whom were
alleged to be foreign citizens or controlled by foreign en-
tities. The first member in question, Franco Mancassola,
KLM did in fact compete with Northwest on certain routes and expressed its con-




''. Id. at 9.
114 Id.
115 Id.
I'l D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41, at 10 (Dec. 21, 1989).
''7 Id. at 10-11.
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was an Italian citizen and served as the vice-chairman of
the board as well as the board's representative to Discov-
ery's management. The DOT was concerned that Man-
cassola was essentially serving the function of president"'
and thus ordered his removal from his liaison position."l 9
The other board members in question, Phillip Ho,
Daryl H.W. Johnston and Barbara Tanabe were all U.S.
citizens. Mr. Ho was also the president of a wholly owned
subsidiary of a Japanese company. The DOT felt that
Ho's connections with this foreign entity, as well as many
other foreign corporations, effectively provided for for-
eign control over Mr. Ho's actions. 120 Therefore, the
DOT called for his removal from the board of directors
and for all of his voting stock to be placed in a voting
trust.12 1 Similarly, because of Mr. Johnston's and Ms.
Tanabe's connections with Mr. Ho and the same Japanese
company, the DOT also called for their removal in order
to completely eliminate that aspect of control. 2 2
As the preceding examples illustrate, the DOT and its
predecessor, the CAB, have consistently and strictly con-
strued the citizenship requirement in the 1958 Act. The
DOT has focused on the actual control element that de-
veloped shortly after the passage of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938.123 It has looked closely not only at how in-
vestment in carriers allow foreign control, but also how
personal relationships between U.S. citizens and foreign
entities may provide a more subtle method of influence.
As will be discussed, however, if the United States intends
to participate in global aviation, Congress and the DOT
will have to take the first step by liberalizing both this citi-
zenship requirement and the DOT's corresponding inter-
''8 Id. at 14-15.
11 In re Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 90-1-60, at 10, 14 (Jan. 29,
1990).
12o D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41, at 13-14.
121 D.O.T. Order No. 90-1-60, at 14.
122 Id.
121 See Uraba, Medellin and Cent. Airways Inc. Certificate of Public Conven-
ience, 2 C.A.B. 334, 337 (1940).
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pretations and applications. 24
B. APPARENT LIBERALIZATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP
REQUIREMENT IN THE DOT's RECONSIDERATION
OF THE NORTHWEST-KLM ALLIANCE
In a revisit by the DOT into the KLM-Northwest alli-
ance (Northwest II), it appeared that the DOT had made a
commitment to the liberalization of its interpretation of
the citizenship requirement, at least as it relates to equity
ownership. 2 5 On January 15, 1991, Northwest filed an-
other petition requesting that the DOT modify the ex-
isting consent order enacted in 1989. 26 Specifically the
petition asked the DOT to:
(1) terminate the requirement of Order 89-9-51 that
KLM's total equity investment in Wings be reduced to 25
percent; (2) permit KLM to hold 49 percent of the equity
in Wings, including 10.544 percent of the voting interest,
free of the voting trust required by the Order, with any
equity in excess of 49 percent to continue to be held in the
trust; (3) permit KLM to designate three members of the
Wings board of directors after that board has been in-
creased from 12 to 15 members; and (4) remove the finan-
cial reporting conditions contained in the order. 27
In its reconsideration, the DOT stated explicitly that it
had reevaluated the relationship between voting equity
and nonvoting equity and would now allow up to forty-
nine percent foreign equity investment in a U.S. carrier. 28
The DOT stated that although it would continue to ex-
amine all avenues of foreign control over a U.S. air car-
rier, "as a general matter, [the DOT] would not construe
foreign equity investment up to these limits, taken alone
121 See infra part VII(C).
125 See In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41
(Jan. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Northwest II].
'21 Id. at 4; see also D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51 (consent order enacted in 1989).
127 D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41, at 4 (citation omitted).
128 Id. at 9. The DOT made it clear that in allowing 49% foreign equity owner-
ship in a U.S. carrier, it was referring to the total foreign equity ownership in
Northwest. Thus, if one foreign entity owns the entire 49 percent, then no other
foreign entity would be allowed to own a portion of the U.S. carrier. Id.
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as indicative of foreign control."' 29 Furthermore, the
DOT stated that such a standard would not be limited to
the Northwest-KLM situation alone and that "[a]s with all
decisions in this area, the decision in this order [would]
constitute a part of the body of [the DOT's] precedent to
be considered in the disposition of future cases as appro-
priate."'130 The DOT also addressed in depth the issue of
the increase of Northwest's board of directors from twelve
to fifteen members and the increase of KLM's number of
representatives on the board from one to three.' 3 ' The
DOT granted the request, noting that the three KLM
members would be more than offset by the twelve other
directors on the board, eleven of whom were U.S. citi-
zens. 32 The DOT went on to say, however, that because
the level of control of each board member is not always
equal, "as a general rule, [it] would not allow a foreign
citizen to hold the position of Chairman of the Board."'133
Nor would the DOT allow a disproportionate number of
foreign directors to hold positions on important corpo-
rate committees because this would be another avenue for
actual control. 3 4 Finally, the DOT maintained the re-
quirement found in the earlier consent order that the
KLM representatives on the board of directors recuse
themselves under certain circumstances.135
Overall, the decision by the DOT in Northwest I ap-
peared to be the beginning of an era where the DOT
would adapt the U.S. airline industry to the international
industry as a whole. In fact the DOT stated in its decision
in Northwest I that the decision itself was partly based on
the Department's "reassessment of the complexities of to-
129 Id.
1.1o Id. at 9 n.22. The DOT made this statement partially in response to a re-
quest by Delta that the DOT state that any decision reached in this case not serve
as precedent. Id. at 6.
1-1 Id. at 10-11.
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day's corporate and financial environment."'' 3 6 Moreover,
the DOT looked closely at the liberalized aviation rela-
tionship between the United States and the Netherlands,
the homeland of KLM, and decided partly in light of this
situation, that there was justification to allow KLM to in-
vest heavily through both money and directors in the
business of Northwest. 137
IV. BRITISH AIRWAYS' PROPOSED PURCHASE OF
USAIR - THE AGREEMENT ITSELF
With the DOT's apparent liberalization of its interpre-
tation of the citizenship requirement of a U.S. air carrier,
it appeared the legal door was open to form airline alli-
ances that would take carriers not only to many different
parts of the world but also into the next generation of in-
ternational aviation. As this situation evolved, British Air-
ways (BA) emerged as an airline with a desire to have a
U.S. connection. 3 ' As a result, USAir, Northwest Air-
lines, Continental Airlines and Trans World Airlines all
attempted to attract the capital of BA.' 3 9 Ironically
enough, BA originally focused its attention primarily on
the KLM-Northwest alliance. 140 However, when the talks
between these airlines failed in March, 1992, USAir be-
came a strong contender.' 4' BA and USAir began talks
regarding the original agreement in June, 1992. t42
BA came to the negotiations with a clear idea of the
type of relationship it was looking for. 43 It was not only
looking for "economic and operational compatibility" but
it was also looking for a "cultural fit.' t44 Finding that
136 Id. at 7.
137 Id. at 7-8; see also infra notes 277-90 and accompanying text (discussing the
DOT's open skies initiative and the open skies agreement between the U.S. and
the Netherlands).









USAir met these standards, the two airlines signed a final
agreement on July 20, 1992 calling for a major investment
in USAir by BA.' 45 On July 21, 1992, the parties an-
nounced the agreement, claiming that it would "form the
world's largest airline alliance that [would] strengthen
both carriers and provide substantial increases in benefits
to the customers, shareholders and employees of both
airlines."' 146
Under the original agreement, British Airways was to
invest $750 million in USAir andwould receive in return a
forty-four percent share in the overall airline equity and
four representatives on the USAir board of directors. 4 7
Specifically concerning the investment by BA, the agree-
ment provided that $520 million of the investment would
have purchased seven percent of the Series "C" Converti-
ble Preferred shares in USAir, which would have been
convertible to common stock at $20.50 per share.' 48 This
part of the investment would have represented twenty-
one percent of the voting stock of USAir, 149 strictly within
the twenty-five percent limit of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.150 The remainder of the $750 million investment
would have been in the form of Series "E" Convertible
Preferred shares which would also have been convertible
14. Id.; see also infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text (discussing the original
proposal in detail).
W4" USAir, British Airways to Invest $750 Million in USAir, First Step in Crea-
tion of World's Largest Airline Alliance (July 21, 1992) (News Release, on file
with USAir, Corporate Communications Department) [hereinafter USAir News
Release].
147 Id. at 2. At the time of the negotiations, there were 13 members on the
USAir board of directors, but through the agreement, the board size would have
increased from 13 to 16 members. Id.
141 Id. at 1.
149 Id. Twenty-one percent of the voting stock was the maximum amount of
voting stock that BA could purchase at the time of the original agreement because
other foreign interests owned four percent of the voting stock in USAir, and as
discussed in previous sections, the limit of total foreign ownership of voting stock
in a U.S. air carrier is 25%. Id. at 1-2; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988). Thus,
BA's voting stock would have been able to increase as other foreign voting inter-
ests diminished, but it would not have been allowed to exceed 25%. USAir News
Release, supra note 146, at 1-2.
'" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988).
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to USAir common voting stock at $20.50 per share.' 5 '
The most controversial aspect of the original agree-
ment between USAir and BA called for a major expansion
of the USAir board of directors so that BA could have
placed a sizable representation on the board. 5 2 Specifi-
cally, the agreement called for an expansion of the USAir
board from 13 to 16 members, four positions of which
would have been occupied by representatives of BA.1 53
Furthermore, up to two other directors would have been
"interlocking independent directors" serving on both the
USAir and BA boards of directors.1 5 4 The most important
part of the changes in store for the board of directors was
the fact that many key decisions 55 of the USAir board of
directors would have to have been approved by a super
majority, consisting of eighty percent of the board's mem-
bers. 156 As will be discussed shortly, if the DOT had eval-
uated the alliance on legal grounds, this provision could
have been a major factor in the failure of the original
agreement. 57
V. SHOULD THE DEAL HAVE SUCCEEDED?
Before considering how the original agreement be-
tween BA and USAir eventually failed, one should under-
151 USAir News Release, supra note 146, at 2. USAir stated in its news release
that "[n]o conversion can take place within the first four years. After five years
USAir has, under certain circumstances, the ability to require conversion of all the
outstanding preferred shares, both Series C and E, to either common stock or to
non-voting common stock according to the regulatory framework -in place at that
time." Id.
Lu2 Id. at 2.
153 Id.
154 Id.
'.-1 According to the agreement between USAir and BA, such decisions included
"any operating or capital budget plan, other annual capital expenditures over
[$1Om], any investment exceeding [$1Om], the appointment or dismissal of any
senior USAir executive, the purchase or sale of route authorities and any material
marketing agreement or joint venture." Nikki Tait, BA and USAir Seek Closer Ties:
Airlines Could Fly Under Common Colors Within Three Years of Deal, FIN. TIMEs, Aug.
29, 1992, at 22.
156 McKenna, supra note 1, at 26.
T,7 See infra notes 236-67 and accompanying text (discussing how veto power
actually played almost no role in the failure of proposed alliance).
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stand the domestic policy arguments that were made and
continue to be made both for and against the alliance.
The following discussion focuses on the policy discus-
sions that took place between the time of the announce-
ment of the original deal and its failure on December 22,
1992. t18 The next section discusses the legal and bilateral
issues involved in the alliance.' 5 9
A. NATIONAL SECURITY
Although national security may no longer be a great
concern of the DOT, at least as it relates to air carrier
ownership,' 60 it must be addressed here for two reasons.
First, opponents of the original deal between BA and
USAir did raise such concerns. 16 1 Second, it is necessary
to recognize the historical importance of national security
concerns.' 62 As mentioned earlier, national security inter-
ests have always been a concern of opponents to foreign
investment in U.S. air carriers.' 63 Such concerns were
once again confirmed during the Persian Gulf War when
U.S. carriers were called upon by the military to aid in
transporting troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf.' 64
- See British Airways Terminates Plan to Invest in USAir, supra note 3.
159 See infra part VI.
-,o See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text (referring to evolution of the
opinion of former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Skinner on the issue of na-
tional security).
161 See infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing concern for national
security as it related to the proposed BA-USAir alliance).
162 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (discussing the national secur-
ity concerns which were partially responsible for the original implementation of
limitations on foreign ownership of U.S. air carriers).
163 Id.
1,1 Under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet ("CRAF") program, developed during the
Korean War and not activated until 38 years later during the Persian Gulf War,
U.S. carriers voluntarily contract to supply a certain number of aircraft to the mili-
tary when called upon to do so. Lester Reingold, CRAF A "Qualified" Success: Civil
Reserve Air Fleet, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Aug. 1991, at 24. Once the Airline volun-
teers, however, it is contractually bound to provide the craft. Id.
Stage I of the CRAF program was activated on August 18, 1990 after the gov-
ernment discovered that the military airlift alone would be unable to transport the
necessary troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia in a timely enough manner. Id.
Stage I consisted of 38 aircraft representing 16 carriers. Id. Stage II of the pro-
gram was engaged on January 16, 1991 and made a total of 187 aircraft available
1993]
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It appears, however, that such concerns may have sub-
sided or were virtually ignored by the DOT as they related
to the BA infusion of capital into USAir.
1. Evolution of DOT Position on National Security
On September 19, 1989, only ten days before the origi-
nal consent order was handed down in the KLM-North-
west Airlines alliance, Samuel Skinner, then U.S.
Transportation Secretary, expressed his concerns over
heavy foreign investment in U.S. carriers by foreign enti-
ties. 165 One of his primary concerns at that time was na-
tional security.' 66 In essence, Secretary Skinner stated
that national defense would certainly be jeopardized if the
U.S. government could not call upon U.S. airlines in times
of military crisis to participate in the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program. 67 Some concluded that national
security concerns played a significant role in the DOT's
forcing of KLM to reduce its investment in Northwest Air-
lines and in eliminating other methods of control that
KLM might have exercised had the deal gone through as
originally planned. 168 Skinner received heavy criticism forthis reasoning.169 The critics stated that the national se-
curity argument was not relevant to the case of KLM-
Northwest because there was no question that in a time of
crisis "the U.S. government could simply commandeer
for the use by the military. Id. Although the government later considered activat-
ing stage III, the last stage of the program, which would have made an additional
217 cargo and 258 passenger planes available, it ultimately decided not to do so.
Transcom Considering CRAF Stage III Activation, 157 AEROSPACE DAILY 181 (1991).
Before the CRAF deployment was deactivated on May 24, 1991, the civilian
aircraft had carried over 310,000 troops and 150,000 tons of cargo. Reingold,
supra, at 24. A total of 110 civil aircraft had flown more than 4,700 missions,
including an average of 23.4 missions per day per carrier during the war's peak
months of January and February of 1991. Id. Overall, the program was termed a
success. Id.
1;1 Charles Storch & Carol Jouzaitis, Critics Return Fire in War on Airline Control,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1989, at CI.
I' See id.
167 Id.
"; Skinner Must Clarify His Airline Policy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1989, at C26.
Id.
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the civilian planes it need[ed]. ' ' 7 °
The other argument facing Secretary Skinner was that
U.S. carriers needed foreign investment to give them the
necessary funds to survive and expand.'17  One commen-
tator expressed his frustration with the DOT's apparent
nationalistic and protectionist views by stating that "[i]t
doesn't matter whether the shareholders of a U.S. airline
reside in London, England, or London, Ohio .... They
are going to want something-profits-and they are going
to manage their investment to maximize their profits."' 
72
This would in turn benefit the U.S. carriers.
This argument eventually caught the attention of Secre-
tary Skinner. In January, 1991, after releasing the modi-
fied order in the KLM-Northwest alliance, Skinner
indicated that there was a need for foreign investment in
U.S. airlines if the latter would be expected to survive.'
73
Despite some public support for his old arguments
against foreign ownership due to possible threats to na-
tional security, 174 Skinner actually made a complete turn
around and stated that allowing U.S. carriers to attract
171 Id. The same critics noted that this is exactly what the U.S. government did
during World War II when it took over the U.S. assets of German firms. Storch
and Jouzaitis, supra note 165, at Cl.
71 Id. Such arguments have also been made in support of the BA-USAir alli-
ance. See USAir, supra note 20, at 7.
172 Storch & Jouzaitis, supra note 165, at C1.
17" Robert W. Stewart & Denise Gellene, Foreigners Can Up Stake in U.S. Airlines,
L.A. TiMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at D3.
174 Paul S. Dempsey, The Sky Ought to be the Limit, N.Y. TiMES,Jan. 26, 1991, § 1,
at 25. This editorial by Paul S. Dempsey, then director of the University of Den-
ver transportation law program, articulates a portion of the national security con-
cern over allowing foreign entities to invest in U.S. airlines:
Foreign ownership restrictions have long existed for many of our
essential infrastructure industries-airlines, intercostal and inland
shipping, telecommunications, broadcasting, electric power produc-
tion and nuclear energy. These restrictions were added to our law,
not because of blind xenophobia but because of national security
considerations.
Aviation is essential to national security, as Operation Desert
Storm confirms. The Air Force simply doesn't have enough C-5A's
to do the job. We maintain a federally subsidized U.S.-flag fleet of
ocean carriers because of the lesson we learned in World War I-
when we looked around for essential ships to ferry troops and sup-
plies across the Atlantic, there were nearly none. Not that long ago,
1631993]
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foreign capital up to the limits stated in the new Northwest
II decision "[would] not compromise national secur-
ity."'' 75 Skinner speculated that the decision would in-
stead attract foreign capital into U.S. air carriers and help
the airlines recover from a year of record losses.
76
2. National Security Issues in the BA-USAir Alliance
Concerning the BA-USAir alliance, USAir maintained
throughout that there was no national security concern
arising from BA's proposed investment. 77 In support of
this argument the airline stated:
There are no foreign policy or national security considera-
tions that should stand in the way of this transaction. U.S.
and British firms have had close investment relationships
for generations. Capital flows freely between the two
countries. With regard to national defense, USAir is a mi-
nor participant (two airplanes) in the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet program. Moreover, the United Kingdom is, and has
for many years been, a close ally of the United States.
There could be no more ideal investment partner for a
U.S. airline. 178
the Government bailed out a collapsing Conrail and Lockheed, in
part, because of their importance to national security.
Of course we could commandeer the aircraft of foreign airlines if
we needed them-seize the property of foreign companies as other
nations have done to American firms. But acquisition of capacity is
not the only problem. Those who argue for foreign ownership of
domestic airlines forget that most of the technological break-
throughs of aviation were inspired by military applications-profi-
ciency in delivering troops and bombs.
Imagine a world where we had never prohibited foreign owner-
ship or foreign airline competition. How many Pearl Harbors would
we have suffered if the dominant domestic airlines in 1940 had been
Lufthansa and Japan Airlines? Although we fought wars with Britain
in two centuries, British Airways doesn't look like much of a national
security threat these days. Neither did Iran Air before the fall of the
Shah.Id.
175 Stewart & Gellene, supra note 173, at D3.
176 Id.
177 USAir, The British Airways - USAir Investment 2 (undated and unpublished




Thus, there appeared to be no legitimate national se-
curity concern with the original BA investment in USAir.
USAir stated that it participated only minimally in the
CRAF program, and even if this were not the case, there
was absolutely no indication that USAir would cease to
participate in the CRAF program as a result of an alliance
with BA.' 79 Furthermore, it appeared that the DOT was
changing its opinion and realizing that foreign capital was
a necessary part of the future aviation industry of this
country. 80 Finally, as has been indicated above, there
seemed to be no lower risk partner than BA, considering
the U.S.'s close relationship with Great Britain in recent
history.' 8 '
B. JOB SECURITY
An issue over which there has been much debate is how
the original BA-USAir alliance would have effectedjobs of
both USAir employees and airline employees in gen-
eral. 82 American, United and Delta Airlines (the Big
Three) claimed that USAirjobs would be in jeopardy as a
result of the British Airways investment in USAir.183
Although the jobs might have been secure for the short
term, the long term threat would have come from a possi-
ble BA takeover of the entire operations of USAir if the
DOT eventually allowed BA to do so. 8 4 In such a situa-
tion, the Big Three claimed, "[e]conomic logic dictates
that integration of [USAir] operations with larger British
171) Id.
-1 See In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41
(Jan. 23, 1991). The DOT allowed a 49% foreign equity ownership in Northwest
Airlines. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the Government originally came forward as ap-
plauding the BA investment into USAir and some commentators take this to be a
sign that the United States' national security should not be and is not a concern in
regard to a BA-USAir partnership. Allen R. Meyerson,July 19-25: Sky Rights; The
United States Weighs a British Partner for USAir, N.Y. TIMES, Late Ed., July 26, 1992,
§ 4, at 2.
I" BA-USAir Investment, supra note 177, at 2.
1112 See American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 2, 10; USAir, supra note 20, at 6-
7.
'1-1 American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 10.
1144 Id.
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Airways [would have lead] to consolidations resulting in a
loss of USAir jobs."'8 5
USAir, on the other hand, argued that the infusion of
capital by British Airways into USAir would clearly have
had the opposite effect of ensuring the jobs of the approx-
imately 46,000 employees of USAir.'86 The airline stated
specifically that "[t]he alliance [would] strengthen USAir
and thus assure the employment future of 46,000 USAir
employees and the economic contribution that they make
to the cities in which they work and live."'' 87 It is clear
that USAir does not have the financial resources with
which the Big Three are operating and thus cannot con-
tinue to absorb the losses that the airline has suffered con-
sistently over the past two years and still sustain its work
force.'88 USAir claimed that one of the most logical
sources of badly needed income or capital for the airline
is that which can come only from a foreign carrier. 189 A
foreign carrier would be the investor most likely to
achieve equal benefits from such an arrangement. 90
Thus, BA appeared and still appears to be a logical con-
duit through which USAir can maintain its viability and
thereby secure the jobs of its employees.
The Big Three also argued, however, that USAir jobs
185 Id.
i"a USAir, The Alliance Should be Approved Because: (undated and unpub-
lished position paper, on file with USAir, Corporate Communications Depart-
ment) [hereinafter Alliance Should be Approved].
187 Id. at 1. USAir also stated unequivocally that "USAir, and the 45,000 jobs it
represents [would] not 'cease to exist.' The investment [would have] permit[ted]
USAir to survive and prosper as an independent U.S.-flag airline. The investment
[would have] create[d] U.S. jobs and enhance[d] airline competition. This is why
the investment [was] enthusiastically supported by USAir's employees." USAir,
supra note 20, at 2.
I'l See supra notes 9-16 (discussing the recent losses of the airline industry as
well as grim prospects for immediate improvement).
"', USAir, supra note 20, at 7.
190 Id. For an airline such as USAir, which has a lower investment grade than
some of its competitors, particularly the Big Three, the only way to attract an
investor is to offer the investor the ability to gain from the transaction. Id. Thus,
logic points to a foreign airline who could invest a substantial amount in the air-
line and receive a major return on its investment through an alliance with a U.S.
carrier. See id.
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were not the only ones that would have been in jeopardy
if the original transaction between BA and USAir had
been approved.' 9' In fact, they argued that the approval
of the alliance might also jeopardize the jobs held at other
U.S. carriers. 192 The Big Three's reasoning was basically
that approval by the DOT of the original BA-USAir deal
would have set a dangerous precedent and allowed other
foreign airlines to "violate U.S. law, buy their way into the
U.S. market and place U.S. international [and domestic]
carriers at a serious competitive disadvantage."' 9 3
The Big Three argued that allowing foreign air carriers
such a large stake in the U.S. domestic market would ef-
fect jobs at these other U.S. airlines in very serious
ways. "'94 First, they claimed that U.S. airline jobs would be
transferred overseas as foreign air carriers bought larger
and larger shares of the U.S. airlines and consolidated
their operations in locations other than the United
States.195 Second, others claimed that with greater com-
petition within the United States from foreign carriers,
pure U.S. carriers would not be able to effectively com-




111 Id. The Big Three further warned that if large amounts of U.S. airline jobs
were transferred overseas as they predicted, the U.S. airline industry would soon
find itself in the same weak position as the U.S. steel and auto industries find
themselves today. Id. at 5.
Several unions whose members work in the aviation industry urged the DOT to
disapprove of the BA-USAir deal or to at least scrutinize heavily the effects which
the original alliance would have had on U.S. jobs. Labor Groups Weigh Their Future
Against BA/USAir Transaction, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 3, 1992, at 368. One union in
particular, Transport Workers of America (TWU) urged this position to the DOT
but felt the administration was unwilling to take on such a scrutiny. Id. The
union's fears stemmed from the fact that Northwest and Continental both were
well on their ways to being controlled by foreign entities, and if the original BA-
USAir deal had been approved, they claimed that "almost 30% of the U.S. com-
mercial aviation [would have been] controlled by foreigners." Id.
TWU also states that the DOT will not be able to save U.S. jobs if these foreign
partners decide to transport the jobs to their own countries. Id. Additionally,
TWU contends that there is good reason to believe that the foreign carriers will
have the incentive "to transfer functions, such as heavy maintenance and dispatch
of U.S. aircraft, to facilities in their home countries." Id. The union predicts cata-
strophic results if such a situation were to occur. Id.
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pete in their own marketplace. 196 A partial reason for
such an inability to compete would be that a large portion
of foreign governments either own or heavily subsidize
their airlines. 197 It would be virtually impossible for pri-
vately-owned U.S. airlines to compete against foreign
government-owned (or subsidized) airlines, unconcerned
about short term losses.' 98 Therefore, airline jobs indus-
'- Duane E. Woerth, Assessing International Aviation, AIRLINE PILOT, Aug. 1992,
at 33.
197 Id. at 33-34.
-s Id. Duane Woerth raised the issue of national airlines in the context of cabo-
tage, but the possible problem of U.S. carriers competing with foreign govern-
ment owned airlines applies equally to issues of foreign control and ownership of
U.S. airlines considering that the U.S. carriers that would conceivably be under
foreign control would be competing directly with other U.S. air carriers in their
own marketplace. To illustrate how serious the problem of government owner-
ship of foreign airlines may be, the following data indicates the extent to which
foreign airlines were owned by their governments as of August, 1992:
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try-wide would conceivably be in jeopardy.
C. LOCAL ECONOMIES IN USAIR SERVED CITIES 9 9
Despite assurances from the U.S. Secretary of Trans-
portation and airline analysts that USAir would not be se-
riously endangered even without the $750 million BA
investment, °° there was some concern for the viability of
the airline if the original investment proposal failed.20'
One of the primary voices of concern was that of Robert
P. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania. 0 2
Before the deal failed, Governor Casey expressed his
support to the DOT for the BA-USAir alliance. 3 In a
letter to the DOT, Casey stated that the BA-USAir ven-
ture "was essential to the economic future of Penn-
sylvania. '20 4 Casey noted that USAir contributes to the
Pennsylvania economy in many important ways.2 0 5  The
Id. at 34 (chart 1).
99 There is also some concern that the national economy will suffer substantial
negative effects from the failure of the original deal. See Boeing Link, SEATrLE
TiMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at Fl. BA stated before the deal failed that regardless of
whether the alliance was successful, the airline intended to spend $6.5 billion
dollars in the United States on Boeing aircraft in the next five years and has the
option to purchase more jets worth the same amount. Id. The airline has further
stated that it intends to pump a total of over $20 billion into the U.S. economy by
1997 including the aircraft purchases already mentioned. id. The other money
would come in the form of spare parts, fuel, salaries, commissions and other fees
related to its operation in the United States. Id.
Furthermore, if this $20 billion were to be combined with USAir's projected
spending, the total would be over $60 billion. Carole A. Shifrin, British Airways,
USAir Escalate Offensive Against Dissenters, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 14-21, 1992,
at 30. There is, however, some concern that, without the full $750 million
investment, USAir will not be in a position to make such expenditures thereby
having substantial effects on the national economy. Id.
200 Jeff Pelline, British Airways-USAir Deal is Dead, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 1992, at
C1;Julie Schmit, Airline Still has Hope for British Air, USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 1992, at
1B.
201 USAir has an accrued debt of approximately $2.3 billion. Schmit, supra note
200, at lB.
20 Gov. Robert P. Casey Urges Approval of USAir Agreement, PR Newswire, Dec. 10,
1992, available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File [hereinafter Casey Urges Approval];
Gov. Casey Supports USAir /British Airways Agreement, PR Newswire, Dec. 8, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File [hereinafter Casey Supports Agreement].
20-. Casey Urges Approval, supra note 202; Casey Supports Agreement, supra note 202.
204 Casey Urges Approval, supra note 202.
205 Id.
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airline is the second largest private employer in the south-
western part of the state and as a result, the salaries the
airline pays to its employees give the airline a "major eco-
nomic presence" in the state. °6 USAir has its largest hub
in Pittsburgh with 347 daily nonstop departures to eighty-
seven destinations. 20 7  Casey's letter also stated that
"eighty-nine percent of the total passengers who
board[ed] airplanes in Pittsburgh in 1991 boarded either
USAir or USAir Express. ' 20 8  Furthermore, USAir had
just made an enormous investment in a new terminal at
the Pittsburgh International Airport which provides state-
of-the-art transportation services to the western region of
the state.20 9 Thus, it is clear that USAir plays a large role
2- Id. Casey's letter to Secretary Card specifically stated that:
Of course, Pennsylvania has an enormous stake in USAir's success
and vitality. USAir is the second largest private employer in south-
western Pennsylvania, employing 12,020 full- and part-time employ-
ees. Its operations generate over $1.1 billion through payroll, fuel,
food, taxes, landing fees and other expenditures.
The airline is an important state-wide presence, with an additional
2,300 employees in the Philadelphia region and a total Pennsylvania
work force of about 15,000. By ensuring a strong and successful
company, the agreement will help secure these high paying jobs and




200o Id. USAir Express is a commuter airline which also belongs to the USAir
parent company, USAir Group, Inc. Id. The airline as of September, 1992 ran
147 daily commuter flights to 33 destinations. Id.
2- Id. Governor Casey's letter continued:
Pennsylvania has undertaken an unprecedented infrastructure in-
vestment in and around the airport. Federal funds have made a sub-
stantial contribution. The economic growth resulting from this
investment will be strengthened by a successful and thriving USAir.
As you know, the new Midfield Terminal was recently completed
in October, the first new airport construction in this country in the
last twenty years. The $766 million partnership among the Com-
monwealth, the federal government, Allegheny County and USAir
produced a state-of-the-art air terminal that now serves as a regional
hub for air, highway and rail transportation.
This hub is linked to all of Western Pennsylvania, through a $400
million investment in the Southern Expressway, the Beaver Valley
Expressway and the Moon Township Interchange highway improve-
ment and construction prospects.
Planning is underway, financed with $2.3 million in state funds
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in the overall economy of Pennsylvania, and the airline's
viability is vital if the state is to maintain and fully utilize
its recent infrastructure investments.20
Although Pennsylvania may be where USAir has its
largest presence,21 ' it is certainly not unrealistic to assume
that the airline is important to many of the other local
economies that it serves.21 2 USAir dominates a large por-
tion of the airline market share on the East Coast,2 " and
its employees live all over the country. Because the origi-
nal alliance between USAir and BA would have allowed
USAir to substantially reduce its debt2 14 and increase its
standing for long term competition,2 15 the alliance would
have therefore had a positive effect on the cities where
USAir employees work, live, and contribute to the local
economies. 1 6
D. CONSUMER BENEFITS
Just as the long term viability of USAir would greatly
benefit the economies of the cities that the airline serves,
the original alliance would have also benefitted consum-
and $500,000 in federal funds, for a proposed magnetic levitation
demonstration project to run from the airport to downtown Pitts-
burgh.
Approval of the USAir/British Airways alliances will reinforce
these investments to ensure southwest Pennsylvania's place as a true
world-class transportation "hub," and ensure continued growth in




212 USAir Sees the Demise of Second-Tier Carriers Without Investment, Av. DAILY, Dec.
1, 1992, at 352 [hereinafter Demise of Second-Tier Carriers]. Pennsylvania is not the
only area which has expressed support for the BA/USAir alliance for economic
reasons. See id. For example, many businesses and civic organizations in Char-
lotte, North Carolina have "implored the DOT to allow the investment to go
through because of USAir's impact on the local economies and their business
transportation and shipping needs." Id.
21, Alan Fredericks & Bill Poling, USAir Chairman: Line has Depth to be a Survivor;
Seth Schofield Interview, TRAVEL WKLY.,June 11, 1992, at 1. The airline's president
stated that the airline is the dominant carrier on the East Coast. Id.
214 Richard M. Weintraub, USAir-British Airways Talks Stall, Bush, Major Fail to
Reach an Accord on Investment Proposal, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1992, at A4.
215. BA-USAir Investment, supra note 177, at 2.
211, Alliance Should be Approved, supra note 186.
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ers of USAir's and BA's air services. t7 The benefits
would have come through more effective competition that
USAir could have provided against the Big Three airlines
in the United States and internationally. 2 " The proposed
alliance would have served 339 destinations in 71 coun-
tries throughout the world.2 '9  The British carrier,
through its investment, was hoping to create a " 'seam-
less' global airline network that would link its London-
based international flights with USAir's large system in
the United States. ' 22 0 The goal of the companies was to
provide uniform air services throughout the world, which
they believed would be very important to the
consumer. 
22 1
.Opponents of the deal, however, stated that the alliance
under any circumstances would benefit the customers
only very modestly. 222 In fact, they claimed that instead of
benefitting consumers, the alliance between BA and
USAir could possibly have led to monopolistic prac-
tices.223 Such a situation would have had detrimental ef-
fects on the consumers.
The stronger and more logical argument, however, ap-
pears to be that it would be better to have five or six major
airlines, one being the alliance between BA and USAir,
217 Shifrin, supra note 199, at 30. U.S. Secretary of Transportation Andrew
Card also supports the view that the deal would have been "very good for Ameri-
can consumers." David Field, Open.Skies Failure Kills BA-USAir Deal, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1992, at CI. Card added, however, that he could not approve the deal
even with such benefits if the U.S.-U.K. landing rights treaty could not be
changed. Id.
2111 Demise of Second-Tier Carriers, supra note 212, at 352.
219 Pact Will Help Consumers, Competition, Chiefs Say, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1992, at
B5 [hereinafter Pact Will Help Consumers].
220 Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. is Said to Oppose USAir Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Late Ed.,
Dec. 21, 1992, at DI.
221 Pact Will Help Consumers, supra note 219, at B5. When asked why customers
should care about the alliance between BA and USAir, Seth Schofield, CEO of
USAir, responded that "[iut is very important from a consumer point of view that
he or she get the same service whether flying from Allentown to Pittsburgh or
from London to Paris." Id.
222 Standing Firm for Open Skies, N.Y. TIMES, Late Ed., Dec. 24, 1992, at A16.
22-. Demise of Second-Tier Carriers, supra note 212, at 352.
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who compete effectively in this country. 24 Certainly the
U.S. market alone, which consists of approximately forty
percent of the entire world market,2 25 is large enough to
support more than only the Big Three. 26 With the failure
of the original deal between BA and USAir, it appeared
that the Big Three had achieved what they wanted: main-
tenance of an oligopoly without major competition from
USAir or British Airways. 27 This oligopoly currently con-
trols about sixty percent of the international and domestic
market.2 It is difficult to see how this situation can bene-
fit the consumer.
VI. WHY THE AGREEMENT ACTUALLY FAILED
The relatively strong arguments outlined above favor-
ing the original alliance between BA and USAir and for-
mer Secretary Card's belief "that (1) carriers from
everywhere would benefit from a loosening of restric-
tions, which would feed competition, and (2) that U.S.
carriers certainly could benefit from more foreign invest-
ments ' 229 lead to the overarching question of why the
original deal did not succeed. Clearly the arguments con-
cerning national security, 230 job security,2 3' faltering local
economies, 232 and consumer benefits2 33 should play a role
in the decisions and policy that the DOT sets forth for the
airline industry. Certainly such concerns were not far
away from the mind of Secretary Card as he began to eval-
uate the possible original alliance between BA and USAir;
however, it appears that such concerns were only secon-
dary to the DOT when it made the final indication that it
224 See generally Shifrin, supra note 199, at 30.
22-1 Leveraging an Airline Linkup, supra note 22, at B9.
226 Shifin, supra note 199, at 30.
227 A Setback for Competition in the Skies, CHI. TRaB., Dec. 24, 1992, at 14.
2211 Pact Will Help Consumers, supra note 219, at B5.
229 A Loss for USAir--and the Public, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1992, at A12
(editorial).
2 0 See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
2.1 See supra notes 182-98 and accompanying text.
2 2 See supra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
2 . See supra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
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would not approve of the alliance between BA and
USAir.2 34 The following discussion also shows that de-
spite the DOT's role of applying the citizenship require-
ment of the 1958 Act, the alliance did not fail due to any
such application or any legal reason at all, but instead
from pressure applied by the Big Three to use the BA-
USAir pact as leverage to gain a stronger hold on the in-
ternational airline market.23 5
A. THE ISSUE OF CONTROL
Although this Comment concludes that the DOT was
concerned more with politics than with the law when it
made its indication, it is still useful to discuss the original
agreement in the context of the citizenship requirement.
From a legal perspective, the issue of the control that BA
would have exercised over USAir did cause some con-
cern.236 As was discussed earlier in this Comment, the
DOT not only applies the letter of the law, that U.S. citi-
zens must own seventy-five percent of the voting stock of
all U.S. carriers and that the president and two-thirds of
the board of directors of such carriers must be U.S. citi-
zens, 237 but it also applies an actual control test.238 Such a
test requires that regardless of the fact that an airline may
meet the above requirements set forth by the 1958 Act, it
must also in fact be controlled by U.S. citizens.2 39
234 British Airways stated, in withdrawing from the agreement with USAir, that
BA had received a clear indication from the U.S. government that the deal as it
stood would not be approved. Pelline, supra note 200, at Cl; see also infra notes
236.306 and accompanying text (discussing the determinative factors which
caused the DOT to attack the BA-USAir alliance).
23-1 See infra notes 268-306 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the
Big Three's emphasis on the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Great
Britain).
2-1 Pelline, supra note 200, at Cl.
21 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988); see also supra note 5 (setting forth the exact
language of the citizenship requirement under current law).
11 See supra notes 52-137 and accompanying text for an in depth discussion of
the control test applied first by the CAB and now by the DOT. But see In re Acqui-
sition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41 (Jan. 23, 1991) (indi-
cating that the DOT was willing to loosen some restrictions on actual control by
allowing KLM to own up to 49% of the common equity in Northwest Airlines).
21 In re Discovery Airways, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-12-41, at 10 (Dec. 21,
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First of all, there is no question that the original BA-
USAir agreement satisfied the explicit standards in the
1958 Act.240 In the deal, BA would have invested $750
million in USAir, purchasing only twenty-one percent of
USAir's voting stock.24 ' This figure is well within the
twenty-five percent limit contained in the 1958 Act.242
Furthermore, the agreement provided that BA could not
have elected more than twenty-five percent of USAir's
board of directors and that USAir's current management
would stay in place,243 also satisfying the requirements of
the 1958 Act.244
Furthermore, the amount of USAir's total equity that
BA would have gained in its investment was also within
the limits recently allowed by the DOT.245 Had the origi-
nal deal between BA and USAir succeeded, BA would
have owned forty-four percent of USAir's total equity,
well within the forty-nine percent parameter.246
BA and USAir both claimed that their agreement com-
plied fully with U.S. law, and USAir was very careful to
insist that it would remain under the control of U.S. citi-
zens. 247 USAir stated specifically that it was aware the
DOT not only looks at the strict requirements of the law,
1989); In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at
4 (Sept. 29, 1989); In re Intera Arctic Services, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 87-8-43, at
5 (Aug. 18, 1987); In re Page Avjet, C.A.B. Order No. 83-7-5, at 2 (July 1, 1983);
Premiere Airlines Fitness Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11, at 103 (May 5,
1982); Willye Peter Daetwyler, D.B.A. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Per-
mit, 58 C.A.B. 118, 119 (1971).
240 USAir, supra note 20, at 3.
241 Id.
242 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988) (providing that at least 75% of the voting
interest in a U.S. air carrier be owned by U.S. citizens).
24. USAir, supra note 20, at 3.
244 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988)(providing that at least two-thirds of the
board of directors and other managing officers of U.S. carriers be U.S. citizens).
24. USAir, supra note 20, at 3; see In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
D.O.T. Order No. 91-1-41, at 10 (allowing KLM to own up to 49% of the com-
mon equity of Northwest Airlines).
241; USAir, supra note 20, at 3.
247 Id. at 4; see also British Airways Terminates Plan to Invest in USAir, supra note 3
(stating that the deal between the two airlines was constructed to comply com-
pletely with U.S. law). BA also noted that the deal had already received antitrust
clearance in the U.S. Id.
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but "also reads a 'control' requirement into the definition,
requiring that 'control' be in the hands of U.S. citi-
zens."2 48 The airline still insisted, however, that it would
remain "an American company run by Americans. ' 2 49
The Big Three and others argued just the opposite.25 °
They claimed that the terms of the agreement between
USAir and BA would have given the latter effective con-
trol over USAir.2 5 ' Thus, despite the agreement's compli-
ance with other aspects of the citizenship requirement,
there has been much argument over whether the foreign-
owned BA would have actually controlled USAir had the
original deal succeeded.
The problem with the agreement between the two air-
lines pertained to BA's presence on USAir's board of di-
rectors.2 5 2 As discussed earlier, the agreement provided
that USAir's board of directors would have been in-
creased from thirteen to sixteen members of which BA
would have gained four seats. 53 Although this would
have given BA only twenty-five percent of the USAir
board of directors, within the limits stated in the 1958
Act, 254 the real problem was the control over key deci-
sions that BA would have had.2 55 The agreement specifi-
cally provided that key decisions such as major financial
24, USAir, supra note 20, at 3. USAir, however, went on to qualify its interpreta-
tion of the control requirement as follows:
The "control" requirement, a concept developed in the days of
heavy-handed federal regulation, is subjective and decided on a
case-by-case analysis, but there are guidelines. First, the require-
ment does not reflect any protectionist sentiment. Second, it is sub-
ject to change as the forms of investment change. Third, and most
important, it is motivated primarily by the pro-competition policies
of airline deregulation, including the statutory mandate "to attract
capital" to a competitive U.S. airline industry.ld.
d249 Id. at 4.
2- See American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 3.
2' Id.
2.,2 See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text (introducing the topic of the
super majority provision contained in the agreement between BA and USAir).
25.1 McKenna, supra note 1, at 26.
24 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988) (providing that at least two-thirds of the
board of directors and other managing officers of a U.S. carrier be U.S. citizens).
2.15 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 26.
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investments, appointment or dismissal of senior USAir
executives or any other major business decision not com-
mon to the airline's daily operations, would have to be
approved by a super majority (eighty percent) of USAir's
board of directors.256
The Big Three were very quick to condemn this aspect
of the deal and argued that such control over USAir by
BA would have been overtly illegal.257 They noted that
"all critical business decisions affecting the business af-
fairs of USAir would [have] require[d] agreement of at
least [eighty] percent of its Board of Directors. 258 The
Big Three then claimed that since BA would have con-
trolled twenty-five percent of that board, BA would have
consequently maintained veto power over the most im-
portant decisions of USAir. 59
USAir, on the other hand, argued that the super major-
ity requirement was a common right conceded in such in-
vestments and would not subject USAir to illegal control
by their British partner. 6 ° USAir stated instead that the
super majority provision was not an unusual concept for
corporate boards of directors and that the provision sim-
ply provided for a system of "management by consen-
sus." 26 The airline argued that such an arrangement is
commonly used to protect minority investment inter-
ests. 26 2 Finally, the airline stated that despite this negative
veto power, BA in no way could affirmatively control
USAir's board of directors.263
It would appear at first glance that despite USAir's
forceful arguments, the issue of control could have been a
deal breaker for the BA-USAir pact. In fact, there are in-
dications that the DOT did raise some concerns regarding
2- Id.; see also Tait, supra note 155, at 22 (listing decisions that would be subject
to super majority approval).
257 American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 3.
258 Id.
259 Id.
2- USAir, supra note 20, at 3.
261 Alliance Should be Approved, supra note 186, at 1.
262 BA-USAir Investment, supra note 177, at 1.
263 id. at 2.
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the veto provision.2 6 If, however, the super majority pro-
vision did cause the deal to fail, it certainly appears that
there could have been a workable solution. The DOT had
earlier dealt with arrangements between foreign and U.S.
carriers where the foreign carrier exercised too much con-
trol over decisions of the U.S. airline. 65 The DOT had
also successfully encouraged the partners to restructure
their arrangements so as to allow the deal to comply fully
with U.S. law.266 Such a solution probably could have
been achieved here, but BA withdrew before such negoti-
ations even began. As this situation and the following dis-
cussion indicate, the reason for BA's withdrawal was not
in fact the DOT's legal concern over control; instead, BA
withdrew because the DOT would have rejected the
agreement on completely different grounds.26 7
B. BREAKDOWN IN BILATERAL TALKS WITH UK AND BIG
THREE'S POLITICIZATION OF THE DEAL
1. Big Three Connect Issues of Foreign Ownership and
Bilateral Liberalization with the U.K
From the moment USAir announced BA's plans to in-
vest $750 million into the airline, the Big Three ada-
mantly opposed the original alliance.26 8 It might seem
logical that the Big Three would have opposed the deal
because an alliance between BA and USAir would pose a
major competitive threat to them in their own market. 269
In a time when the airlines are reporting record losses,27O
261 Pelline, supra note 200, at C I.
165 See In re Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51,
at 7 (Sept. 29, 1989) (discussing KLM's proposal to appoint a three-member advi-
sory committee with the purpose of advising Northwest in its financial and other
affairs).
261 Id. at 9 (discussing KLM's agreement to discard plans to appoint an advisory
committee).
26 See infra notes 268-306 and accompanying text (discussing the politicization
of the deal between BA and USAir).
268 See generally American Airlines et al., supra note 2.
269 A Loss for USAir and the Public, supra note 229, at A12.
271 See supra note 11 (for an in depth discussion of recent losses by the airlines).
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their reluctance to open the market to a foreign carrier is
understandable.
The Big Three, however, claimed that their opposition
was based on completely different grounds.2 7' In fact,
they stated that they did not fear competition; they feared
that approval of this ownership arrangement between BA
and USAir would effectively destroy the ability of U.S. car-
riers to compete.272 The Big Three accused BA of seeking
backdoor access to the domestic U.S. market and effec-
tively avoiding U.S. laws against cabotage 73 They con-
cluded that if the alliance had been allowed to succeed
without concessions granted to U.S. carriers by the U.K.,
the alliance would have been a direct assault on the U.S.
airline industry, leaving U.S. carriers with no means to
compete and the U.S. government with no leverage to
gain access to the British market.274 Thus, the Big Three
claimed that their only problem with the proposed alli-
ance between BA and USAir was set in the context of the
current strict air transport agreement between the U.S.
and the U.K.275
2. DOT Calls for Open Skies - Cites U.S. Netherlands
Agreement
The Big Three focused on the DOT's policy to "permit
limited ownership flexibility only in cases where the
United States has a liberalized aviation relationship with
the country of the foreign investor. ' 276 On March 31,
1992, former Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card,
announced the DOT's so-called open skies initiative.2 77
The initiative is directed toward European countries and
27 American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 5.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 3.
274 Id. at 5.
27- American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 5. The Big Three in fact claimed
that they would wholeheartedly support an alliance between BA and USAir if only
equal concessions could be won from Great Britain. Julie Schmit, Rivals Seek Reci-
procity, USA TODAY, July 22, 1992, at BI.
2711 American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 4.
217 U.S. to Explore Open Shies Agreements with European Nations Offering Free Access, PR
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basically states that the U.S. would offer to negotiate
"open-skies agreements" with any European country that
is willing to offer U.S. air carriers unlimited access to their
respective airline markets.278 Subsequently, after calling
for public comment to aid in formulating an official defini-
tion of open skies, 279 the DOT issued an order stating the
final definition of open skies. This definition focused on
"(1) [o]pen entry on all routes; (2) [u]nrestricted capacity
and frequency on all routes; [and] (3) [u]nrestricted route
and traffic rights, that is, the right to operate service be-
tween any point in the United States and any point in the
European country. ' 280
A key example of the type of agreement the DOT is
seeking with European countries is the recent agreement
Newswire, March 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File [hereinafter
U.S. to Explore Open Skies Agreements].
278 Id.
279 In re Defining Open Skies, D.O.T. Order No. 92-4-53 (Apr. 29, 1992) (re-
questing public comment on definition of open skies).
280 In re Defining Open Skies, D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13 app. (Aug. 5, 1992).
The following is the definition of open skies as defined by the DOT in its final
order:
OPEN-SKIES Definition
These are the basic elements which will constitute our definition of
"OPEN SKIES" for purposes of the Secretary's initiative:
(1) Open entry on all routes;
(2) Unrestricted Capacity and frequency on all routes;
(3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is the right to oper-
ate service between any point in the United States and any point in
the European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate
and beyond points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminal-
ization, or the right to carry Fifth Freedom Traffic;
(4) Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom
Markets and (1) in intra-EC markets: price matching rights in third-
country markets, (2) in non intra-EC markets: price leadership in
third-country markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Free-
dom carriers in those markets have it;
(5) Liberal charter agreement (the least restrictive charter regu-
lations of the two governments would apply, regardless of the origin
of the flight);
(6) Liberal cargo regime (criteria as comprehensive as those de-
fined for the combination carriers);
(7) Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers would be
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signed between the United States and the Netherlands.28 '
The agreement, signed on September 4, 1992, will allow
any U.S. carrier to provide service from any point in the
United States to any point in the Netherlands and vice-
versa.2 82 The deal also allows the freedom to carry both
passengers and cargo, places no limitations on the
number of flights or types of planes used, grants the free-
dom to form any aviation related businesses, and grants
the freedom for U.S. and Dutch carriers to work together
on any route between the two countries.2 8 In fact, Secre-
tary Card stated that the agreement embraces all elements
of the definition of open skies that the DOT published in
August of 1992.84
The agreement further provides for "cooperation and
integration of commercial operations between airlines of
the U.S. and the Netherlands," and the DOT agreed to
give "fair and expeditious" evaluations of such agree-
ments and antitrust immunity requests.2 5 Northwest Air-
able to convert earnings and remit in hard currency promptly and
without restriction);
(8) Open code-sharing opportunities;
(9) Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perform/con-
trol its airport functions going to support its operations);
(10) Procompetetive provisions on commercial opportunities,
user charges, fair competition and intermodal rights; and
(11) Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of
and access for computer reservation systems.
Id. (citation omitted).
2, The Turbulent Travel Industry; U.S., Netherlands Sign "Open Skies" Pact; Aviation:
The Agreement Allows Airlines from the Two Countries Unrestricted Access to Each Other's
Airports, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at DI [hereinafter U.S., Netherlands Sign "Open
Skies" Pact].
282 Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
for Approval and Antitrust Immunity of an Agreement Pursuant to Sections 412
and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, as Amended, D.O.T. Order No. 92-11-27, at
3 (Nov. 16, 1992).
283 David Phelps & Josephine Marcotty, Northwest, KLM begin 'Open Skies' Agree-
ment; As a Result, Both Carriers Will Have Unlimited Access to United States, Netherlands,
STAR TRIB., Sept. 5, 1992, at ID.
284 U.S., Netherlands Sign "Open Skies" Pact, supra note 281, at Dl; see D.O.T. Or-
der No. 92-8-13 app.; see also supra note 280 (setting forth the complete definition
of open skies as stated by the DOT in its order).
285 Bill Poling, Northwest, KLM Seek to Operate as 'Single Firm' Under New Pact;
Northwest Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, TRAVEL WKLY., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1.
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lines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines have subsequently
taken advantage of this liberalization and have won the
DOT's approval for a new Commercial Cooperation and
Integration Agreement and antitrust immunity. 86 Ac-
cording to the agreement, Northwest and KLM intend to
operate all of their services as if they were a single air-
line.287 Furthermore, the KLM-Northwest alliance was
able to convince the DOT to further liberalize the require-
ments that it had earlier imposed upon the airlines in or-
der to ensure compliance with the citizenship
requirement of the 1958 Act. 288 The DOT allowed such
liberalization and ruled that the alliance would remain
under the control of U.S. citizens.2 8 9 Thus, with this ap-
proval and with the comments of former Secretary Card
stating that the open skies agreement between the U.S.
and the Netherlands should be a model for future agree-
ments with other European countries,2 9 0 it is becoming
clear that the DOT is doing exactly what the Big Three
would hope: placing emphasis on the need for such open
skies agreements before allowing significant foreign own-
ership liberalization to take place.
286 Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
for Approval and Antitrust Immunity of an Agreement Pursuant to Sections 412
and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, as Amended, D.O.T. Order No. 93-1-11, at I
(Jan. 11, 1993).
211, D.O.T. Order 92-11-27, at 4.
288 See supra notes 125-37 (discussing the final DOT order with regards to the
original KLM/Northwest alliance). The DOT concluded that nothing in the new
agreement will cause Northwest to cease being a U.S. citizen. D.O.T. Order No.
93-1-11, at 16-17. The DOT did, however, retain the reporting requirement that
it had earlier imposed. Id. at 17; see also D.O.T. Order No. 89-9-51, at 9 (original
imposition of reporting requirement). In its approval of the new agreement, the
DOT eliminated the recusal requirement for members of the board of Northwest
who represented KLM in matters of finance or competition. D.O.T. Order No.
93-1-11, at 17. The order did, however, impose a new recusal requirement in
matters related to Northwest's decision to terminate or maintain the agreement
and in matters regarding U.S. negotiations with the EC and the Netherlands. Id.
299 Id. at 16.
2911 U.S., Netherlands Sign "Open Skies " Pact, supra note 281, at DI.
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3. USAir's Plea for Disconnection of Issues of Foreign
Ownership and Bilateral Liberalization
USAir recognized that the Big Three appeared to be us-
ing the prospects of a similar open skies agreement with
the U.K. to gain more route authority into the British
market.29' USAir argued, however, that this line of rea-
soning was misguiding and that the Big Three neither
needed nor wanted additional authority, but simply
wanted to connect the issues of foreign ownership and an
open skies agreement because they knew that any negotia-
tions with the U.K. for liberalization would last beyond
the deadline for approval of the deal set in the agreement
between the airlines.292 Thus, they simply were looking
for a way to kill the alliance and prevent the birth of a
powerful competitor.293
USAir urged the DOT to focus its attention on the facts
of the case and on the law, thus separating the alliance
from claims for open skies by the Big Three.294 USAir
stated that the deal, as it stood, complied strictly with U.S.
law, including the Federal Aviation Act and the case-by-
case analysis undertaken by the DOT in such matters. 95
The airline requested the DOT not to focus on the bilat-
eral issues but to follow the policy encouraging foreign
investment and the open investment policy set forth by
the Bush administration.29 6 Without such a commitment,
2' USAir, supra note 20, at 6.
292 Id. The Big Three argued that they are denied large amounts of the Euro-
pean market share because they lack the authority to operate between the U.K.
and Continental Europe. Id. at 6. They further claimed that such rights would be
comparable to what BA would have gained through its alliance with USAir. Id.
USAir claimed, however, that although British Airways flies some routes between
the U.S. and U.K. and then to other European countries, the majority of air travel
between the U.S. and Europe consists of non-stop flying, and the Big Three domi-
nate this market. Id. Thus, the Big Three's argument that they need more author-
ity from Great Britain to establish themselves in the U.S.-Europe market seems to
have been a shield covering their underlying motives of delaying the approval of
the BA-USAir alliance until after the deadline had passed. Id.
293 Id. at 2.
294 Id. at 1.
295 Id.
291 Id. at 4-5.
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USAir stated, the airlines will be unable to realize the true
gains of free competition as envisioned in the concept of
deregulation. 97
4. DOT Failed to Take First Step in Global Aviation
Early on, the Big Three, in a rare period of cooperation,
utilized all resources to ensure that the DOT did not sepa-
rate the issue of the alliance from that of bilateral liberali-
zation between the U.S. and its British counterpart. 98
They believe that it would have been a mistake fatal to the
U.S. airline industry for the DOT to have failed to see the
connection between the two issues.2 99  The Big Three,
and in fact both coalitions, hired some of the most power-
ful lobbyists to represent their views in Washington.3 °°
The Big Three called for open skies immediately after
the announcement of the original deal. 0 ' The DOT,
however, was quick to state that it would not relate the
issues of bilateral liberalization and the BA-USAir alli-
ance, and it would therefore not require a quid pro quo
from the U.K. "as the price of approval" for the alli-
ance.3 0 2 It was soon clear, however, that the Big Three
had gained an upper hand and had motivated the Bush
Administration to start talks with the U.K. on the liberali-
211 Id. at 5; see also Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1302(a)(3), 1302(a)(7)(A) (1988) (setting forth the procompetitive policy be-
hind airline deregulation).
2111 Andrews, supra note 220, at Dl.
2119 See American Airlines et al., supra note 2, at 5 (claiming that the alliance
would have been a "direct assault" on the U.S. airline industry). Their concern
stated basically that BA would obtain control over USAir and thus maintain a
global franchise while being served by the alleged protectionist policies of its own
country. Id. Beyond the immediate circumstances, the Big Three also feared that
this alliance would have set a precedent for other foreign carriers to enter and
gain great benefits from the U.S. markets while their governments refuse recipro-
cal treatment of U.S. carriers, thus destroying the latter's ability to compete. Id.
3-0 Andrews, supra note 220, at D1. Airlines on both sides of the deal hired top
lobbyists. The Big Three were represented by the firm of William E. Brock, who
was the U.S. trade representative and later Secretary of Labor under President
Ronald Reagan. Id. Howard H. Baker, Jr., former White House Chief of Staff
under Ronald Reagan represented USAir and BA in Washington. Id.
"M0 Schmit, supra note 275, at Bl.
302 Industry Buzzes Over DOT Secretary 's Comments on UK. Bilateral, AVIATION DAILY,
July, 30, 1992, at 177.
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zation of the air services agreement between the two
countries."' 3 Despite the efforts of top government offi-
cials in both countries, the original talks ended in
failure. 0 4
In the end, it was clear that as a result of the extreme
politicization of the alliance, the DOT changed its posi-
tion and hinged its approval or lack thereof on the liberal-
ization of the air services agreement between the two
countries. 0 5 Former Secretary Card, in fact, stated that
he might have even been willing to overlook the veto
power that BA would have had over the decisions of the
USAir board of directors; however, with the current state
of the agreement between the two countries, he claimed
he would have been unable to approve the deal.3 0 6 The
DOT compelled BA to withdraw its offer and thus faded
an opportunity for the DOT to take the first step in show-
ing the world that the U.S. would be a leader in global
aviation.
VII. FINAL ANALYSIS - WHERE DOES THE ISSUE
OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP LAND?
In a final analysis of the issue of the antiquated citizen-
ship requirement in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and
the effect of the DOT's original informal rejection of for-
eign investment into USAir, three points must be made.
First, the DOT's open skies initiative would give U.S. car-
riers a stranglehold on small foreign domestic markets
and is unlikely to gain wide support throughout Europe.
Second, the politicization of the issue of foreign owner-
ship requirements and the DOT's connection of the liber-
alization of such requirements to the issue of open skies
agreements will ultimately be detrimental to global avia-
33 Card Flies to London for Talks; Majors Remain Critical of DOT, AVIATION DAILY,
Oct. 21, 1992, at 115.
so, Weintraub, supra note 214, at A4.
3o USAir Pilots Disappointed by British Air Decision, PR Newswire, Dec. 22, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Air File.
s- James Ott, U.S. Sets Litmus Test for Foreign Investments, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 4, 1993, at 30.
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tion. Finally, if the U.S. truly wishes to participate in
global aviation, the current inconsistent position of the
DOT on the issue of foreign ownership is unacceptable.
The situation requires the DOT and Congress to liber-
alize the citizenship requirement in order to take the first
step in this globalization process.
A. WILL THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE FLY?
It is important to carefully scrutinize the invitation to
negotiate open skies agreements that the DOT recently
proposed to European countries. 30 7 On the face of the
proposal, it makes sense that in order to have true global
air carriers or any real global aviation opportunities, U.S.
air carriers must have access to the domestic markets of
European countries. The open skies initiative would cer-
tainly provide this access. 308 There remains, however, the
question of whether European countries will value the
benefits of unrestricted access to the U.S. markets as
highly as the DOT seems to believe.
For foreign carriers such as British Airways, it seems
quite clear that free access to the U.S. domestic market
would mean the addition of a major piece to its global
aviation puzzle.30 9 We have already seen, however, that
the U.K. does not deem such benefits sufficient to open
up its market and give U.S. carriers free access under an
307 U.S. to Explore Open Skies Agreements, supra note 277.
308 See In re Defining Open Skies, D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13 (Aug. 5, 1992).
,09 See Richard W. Stevenson, British Air's World is Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1992, at Dl. BA is currently in the process of positioning itself as a true global
airline. Id. The airline's recent alliances and deals around the world include the
following:
(1) a 25% stake in Australia's Qantas Airlines for $450 million giv-
ing BA access to South Pacific routes;
(2) a 49.9% stake in France's TAT European Airways for $108
million;
(3) a 49% stake in Germany's domestic carrier, Deutsche BA;
(4) a proposed joint venture with Aeroflot in Russia to create a new
airline, Air Russia, that will serve Europe, the U.S. and Asia from
Moscow.
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open skies initiative.3 1 0 Furthermore, British Airways it-
self stood by its government's decision to refuse such ac-
cess.3 1 1 It seems extremely likely that if a country with
such a powerful air carrier as BA would not see fit to open
its routes to U.S. carriers in return for the benefit which
an alliance with a U.S. carrier would give BA, other
smaller European countries will not rush to take advan-
tage of the DOT's proposal for free access.
It seems more logical, however, that European coun-
tries will be extremely reluctant to open their markets
completely to U.S. carriers. Although access to U.S. mar-
kets might initially appear to benefit European carriers,
they will likely be unable to stand the competition from
U.S. carriers in their own countries, much less be able to
compete with the Big Three on a global scale.
While it is true that many foreign carriers are owned
wholly or partially by their home governments,3 1 2 this
does not necessarily indicate that they would be more able
or willing to accept the open skies initiative. France's re-
cent renunciation of its air transport agreement with the
U.S.3 1 3 serves as a good example. France owns and oper-
ates Air France.31 4 While the 40-year-old agreement be-
tween France and the U.S. placed "no firm limit on U.S.
carrier capacity,"' 1 5 U.S. carriers have offered extensive
service to Paris over the last decade, including service
from secondary points within the U.S. As a result, Air
France's market share in France dropped from forty-five
percent to thirty percent. 6 It is certainly easy to see how
the financially capable U.S. carriers could have this effect
on local air carriers in other foreign countries, thus mak-
ing the prospect of open skies very unappealing.
.110 Richard W. Stevenson, British Air Halts Plan to Purchase Big Stake in USAir,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at Al.
-I Id.
-112 See Woerth, supra note 196, at 34 (chart 1) (listing level of government own-
ership in many foreign carriers).
-113 France Gives Up Pact, supra note 23, at 39.
114 See Woerth, supra note 196, at 32 (chart 1).
115 France Gives Up Pact, supra note 23, at 39.
31i Id.
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B. THE DOT MUST PLAY THE GLOBAL AVIATION
GAME FAIRLY
Even though a complete open skies policy is unlikely to
achieve wide success, this fact is not an indication that we
should not attempt to liberalize, to some degree, our avia-
tion agreements around the world. It is a strong reason,
however, not to hinge the assimilation of the U.S. airline
industry into the global market on the willingness of other
countries to grant free access to U.S. carriers. In other
words, the DOT should not hinge approval of such alli-
ances as that between BA and USAir on open skies agree-
ments with the country of the foreign air carrier involved.
The DOT must show its foreign counterparts that it is
willing to approach global aviation on fair terms.
If the DOT continues to insist that foreign countries
open their skies before it liberalizes foreign ownership
policies, it will send a negative signal to other countries
concerning the United States' commitment, or lack
thereof, to participating fairly in future global aviation.
By insisting that carriers such as the Big Three gain virtu-
ally free access to domestic markets of foreign carriers at-
tempting to participate in the U.S. market, the United
States is implying that it will only participate in world avi-
ation if it can have the upper hand and be virtually guar-
anteed success. Despite recent losses, 1 7 the Big Three
appear to have the ability to infiltrate virtually any Euro-
pean Market that opens its skies. This is in contrast to the
inability that a foreign carrier would have to enter the
U.S. market which is already under the tight control of the
oligopoly.
C. THE UNITED STATES MUST TAKE THE FIRST STEP IN
GLOBALIZATION
The foregoing analysis leads to the suggestion that to
realize world aviation, the United States must take the first
step to show that it is in fact willing to do so fairly. I
317 See supra note 11 (discussing recent losses of U.S. airlines).
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would suggest that this step is composed of two parts.
The first part, discussed above, is to depoliticize the issue
of foreign ownership of U.S. carriers and to focus instead
on the law itself.3 18 This means, at least for the time be-
ing, that the DOT should separate the issues of foreign
ownership and open skies or liberalization agreements.
This would allow foreign carriers both the time and an
avenue to assess whether access to the U.S. market would
be beneficial. Such a step would in effect liberalize the
citizenship requirement in the U.S. because by allowing
significant foreign ownership without bilateral liberaliza-
tion first, the DOT will be eliminating a threshold test that
it has previously imposed on other airlines.31 9
Secondly, the United States should liberalize the out-
dated language of the citizenship requirement so that the
law can adapt to the quickly developing world economy.
The current law, which derives from the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, states among other things that in order for a
carrier to be a U.S. citizen, two-thirds of its board of di-
rectors and other managing officers must be U.S. citizens,
and U.S. citizens must also own seventy-five percent of its
voting stock.3 20 This law limits any one foreign entity to
ownership of only twenty-five percent of the voting stock
minus any percentage of voting stock that other foreign
entities might already own. 21 Such a limit inhibits the
ability of large investors to have any influence on the per-
formance of their investments.
With this in mind, this Comment suggests the following
change in the statute. The current language of the statute
is as follows:
"Citizen of the United States" means ... (c) a corporation
. See supra part VI(B).
i", See supra note 306 and accompanying text (Secretary Card stating that he
would have liberalized the actual control test in BA-USAir alliance but for the
current state of air services agreement between U.S. and U.K.).
-20 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988).
321 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 26. In the original alliance with USAir, it was
noted that at least at the outset, BA could only buy up to 21% because other
foreign interests already owned four percent of the voting stock of USAir. Id.
19931 189
190 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
or association created or organized under the laws of the
United States or of any state, territory, or possession of
the United States, of which ... at least 75 per centum of
the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who
are citizens of the United States or of one of its
possessions.
The statute should be changed to read:
"Citizen of the United States" means ... (c) a corporation
or association created or organized under the laws of the
United States or of any state, territory, or possession of
the United States, of which ... at least 51 per centum of
the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who
are citizens of the United States or of one of its
possessions.
The change in the percentage of voting stock allowed to
be owned by foreign entities to forty-nine percent is cer-
tainly not a new idea. 22 However, it is an idea that Con-
gress must seriously consider again after the failure of the
original proposed alliance between BA and USAir.323 The
322 See Stewart, supra note 29, at 716-18.
2- In fact, immediately prior to the publication of this Comment, the National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry recently released its
report recommending to the President and Congress that the citizenship require-
ment be changed to allow foreign ownership of U.S. airlines up to 49% of voting
equity. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 22 (1993). The Commis-
sion emphasized that although such liberalization in the long term should be con-
tained with broad-based multi-national agreements, in the short term Congress
should allow larger investments under the current bilateral system. Id. The Com-
mission stated specifically:
The Commission appreciates that conclusion of such multi-na-
tional agreements will take time, perhaps several years. We believe
it is critical, however, for the United States to see the future and
shape its strategy today.
While we envision a future in which cross-border airline invest-
ment would flow more freely in a more open system, we also believe
there is an opportunity today to permit expanded access to interna-
tional capital markets by allowing larger investments from foreign
investors under the current bilateral system. The United States
should approve foreign investment of up to 49 percent voting equity
in U.S. airlines, in the context of bilateral agreements which are re-
ciprocal and enhance the prospects of securing the ultimate goal of
pre-competitive, multi-national agreements. The Commission also
believes that in any such 49 percent or other sizable ownership situa-
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change will in effect serve two purposes. First, the in-
creased level of voting stock ownership will allow foreign
investors to have a higher level of control in the perform-
ance of their investments without allowing them to con-
trol a majority of a U.S. airline's voting shares. Thus,
foreign interests should be more willing to invest in U.S.
carriers that are desperately in need of capital.
Secondly, the change will send a strong message to the
rest of the aviation world that the U.S. is ready to truly
participate in world aviation and that it is ready to do so
fairly. This message should be sent in the hopes that for-
eign countries will ultimately allow U.S. carriers to access
their markets at a significant level. If foreign carriers dis-
cover that they can truly benefit from increased alliances
with U.S. carriers without losing a foothold in their own
markets, they will be less likely to oppose liberalization of
bilateral aviation agreements. With such liberalization
will come the ever awaited world global aviation industry.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The strict citizenship requirement of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 must be liberalized. The requirement
originated out of the protectionist policies of a U.S. gov-
ernment that had just suffered through World War I. Af-
tion, adequate safeguards should be in place to protect the rights of
the remaining shareholders.
Id. The Commission then made the following qualified recommendation to
change the citizenship requirement:
We recommend:
- The Federal Aviation Act be amended to allow the U.S. to negoti-
ate bilateral agreements that permit foreign investors to hold up to
49 percent voting equity in U.S. airlines, providing those bilateral
agreements are liberal and contain equivalent opportunities for U.S.
airlines; the foreign investor is not government-owned; there are re-
ciprocal investment rights for U.S. airlines, and the investment will
advance the national interest and the development of a liberal global
regime for air services.
The Commission considers it essential to enforce our currently
held rights, particularly when so many of our trading partners are
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ter the Great Depression, Congress set the requirement at
the current level. However, the world economy and the
nature of the aviation industry have changed significantly,
and global aviation appears to be on the horizon. While
the U.S. has a vested interest in being a major player in
world aviation, the government and the airline industry as
a whole must realize that other countries are essential to
the globalization process. The United States, therefore,
must adopt both policies and laws that will make it benefi-
cial for other countries to shed their own protectionist
policies and participate in the new world market. The first
key step which the United States must take is to liberalize
the citizenship requirement both in the written law and
the DOT application of that law. Once foreign carriers
determine they can compete against the U.S. carriers and
benefit from U.S. market access through foreign owner-
ship, foreign countries will let down their barriers and
open the gateway to true global aviation.
